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California Supreme Court Survey
December 1986-February 1987
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE ........................................

A. In a case where a public agency's construction
project substantially differed from that depicted in
its EnvironmentalImpact Report, the 180-day time
limit for filing a complaint against the agency
tolled not at date of the project's commencement,
but upon the plaintiff's receipt of actual or
constructive notice of the project's nonconformity to
the previously filed Environmental Impact Report:
Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd District
Agricultural Ass'n .....................................
B. Mentally incapacitatedminors, who have parents or
guardians,are not allowed to invoke a tolling
statute in filing a tort claim against the state.
Nevertheless, they are entitled to file the claim
within one year of the accrual of the cause of action
if they were a minor for the entire 100-day claim
limit period and the delay in filing was not
attributableto any lack of diligence on the part of
the minor: Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles .......
C. Dismissal of a party's motion for trial de novo
based solely on that party'sfailure to offer evidence
at a mandatory arbitrationproceeding was
improper: Lyons v. Wickhorst ........................
D. Statements made during settlement negotiations
may not be privilegedfor the purposes of a
subsequent actionfor abuse of process: Oren Royal
Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma,
Inc ...................................................
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ...................................
A. Where a prison inmate is accused of a prison rule
violation based solely on confidential information,
an in camera proceeding at which the hearing
officer could test the veracity of the source is not
required by federal or state due process: In re
Jackson.....
.................................
B. Persons charged with contempt for violation of an
i7ijunction or order in "red light" abatement actions
are entitled to a jury trial under the California
Constitution; a defendant is guilty of separate
contempts for each day the injunction is violated
Mitchell v. Superior Court.............................
C. A black criminal defendant is not deprived of his
sixth amendment right to an impartialjury where a
branch court limits its juror selection pool to only a
portion of a county, despite the fact that the portion
includes demographicallyfewer blacks than does the
county as a whole: O'Hare v. Superior Court .........
D. The failure of counsel to present mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial,
although at the express request of the defendant, is
a deprivation of the right to the effective assistance
of counsel, and is reversible error on a judgment of
death: People v. Bloyd ................................
E. To show a denial of the right to the effective
assistance of counsel on a petition of habeas corpus,
a condemned defendant must show by a
preponderanceof the evidence that counsel's
performance was deficient and that the deficiency
prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding: People v.
Ledesm a .....................
........................
F. The decision in People v. Harris,holding that the
exclusive use of voter registrationlists in compiling
the juror pool may result in an unconstitutionally
unrepresentativejury, will not be applied
retroactively: People v. Myers ........................
G. A defendant is not denied effective assistanceof
counsel where guilt is conceded and counsel
emphasizes a defendant's insanity plea. Where a
defendant offers evidence of good characterin
mitigation of the charges against him, a "no
sympathy" instruction is improper: People v. Wade.
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based on a submitted transcriptof the preliminary
hearing, the trial court's error in failing to advise
the defendant of waiver of his right against selfincriminationis reversible only when the error is
prejudicial: People v. Wright ......................... 1039
I. Section 647(f) of the Penal Code, which makes public
drunkenness a criminal offense, is constitutional,
even as applied to chronic alcoholics: Sundance v.
M unicipal Court .......................................
1041
III.

CORPORATE LAW .........................................

1048

In a merger situation where a shareholderwas
aware of all facts which constituted the basis of his
claim of corporatefiduciary misconduct, an
appraisalproceeding was the shareholder'sexclusive
remedy: Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc .................... 1048
IV.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ...................................

A.

The substantial evidence rule was the proper
standardfor a trial court's review of a Board of
Prison Terms' decision to revoke or rescind a
previously grantedparole: In re Powell ..............

1054

1054

B.

When executing a search warrant,the police must
obtain priorjudicial authorization to use a
motorized battering ram and exigent circumstances
must exist at the time of execution: Langford v.
Superior Court ........................................
1057
C. For capital sentencing procedure,only one special
circumstance per category can be imposed. A
capital defendant who does not receive benefits of
disparate sentence review is not denied equal
protection: People v. Allen ...........................
1058
D. An eleven-year-old child's consent to enter a
residence to effect an arrest warrantwas held
invalid where the police had no reasonablegrounds
to believe that the defendant was inside the
residence: People v. Jacobs ...........................
1062
E.
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The question of prosecutorialdue diligence is
subject to independent appellate review: People v.
Louis.................................................
1064
Warrantless aerialsurveillance of a person's
marijuanagarden is not an unconstitutionalsearch
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when the garden is not within the curtilage of a
home: People v. Mayoff ..............................
1065
G. The standardof review for violation of the state
constitutional right to an interpreteris whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:
People v. Rodriguez ...................................
1067
H. It is reversible error to refuse a jury instruction
regarding the effect of psychologicalfactors on
eyewitness identifications when the defendant's
identification is crucial to the issue of guilt: People
v. W right .............................................
1070
V.

EVIDENCE ................................................

1071

A. Requirement that a criminal defendant make
"reasonableefforts" to secure attendance of an
adverse witness at the preliminary hearing to avert
admission of written statements as substituted
testimony was unconstitutional;admission of such
affidavit was harmless errorwhere other sufficient
evidence was shown to support a finding of
probable cause: Mills v. Superior Court ............... 1071
B. A witness may not testify after having undergone
hypnosis. A warrantlessparole-orientedsearch may
be conducted even when the parolee is incarcerated:
People v. Johnson .....................................
1073
C. Statements obtained from a criminaldefendant in
violation of the privilege against self-incrimination
are inadmissible as affirmative evidence as well as
for impeachment purposes: People v. May ........... 1074
VI.

INSURANCE LAW .........................................

Insurance companies' duty of good faith and fair
dealing extends to informing insureds about their
rights under a policy when lack of knowledge may
lead to loss of benefits orforfeiture of rights:
Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California ...................
VII.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW ...............................

A.

1076

1076
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The State of Californiais not required to reimburse
local governments for statutes that result in some
incidental cost to local agencies, but is required
only to provide subvention when new programs are
enacted that impose unique requirements on local
governments not applying to all state residents:
County of Los Angeles v. State of California ..........
1078
B. A municipally owned water company charging
nonresidents higher ratesfor water service than
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residents,does not violate nonresidents' equal
protection rights, provided the differential rests on
a reasonable basis other than residentialstatus:
Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura ...................
VIII.

TORT LAW ...............................................
A. In defamation actions in which the gravamen of the
plaintiff's claim is the alleged injuriousfalsehood
of a statement made by media defendant, the first
amendment of the United States Constitution
requires that the plaintiffplead and prove the
statement to be a falsehood, and be "of and
concerning" the plaintiff in some way: Blatty v.
New York Times Co ...................................
B. Employee's civil action for damagesfor intentional
infliction of emotional distress which caused
physical injuries based on conduct normally
occurring within the course and scope of
employment was barred by Workers' Compensation
Act which thus provided exclusive remedy: Cole v.
Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist ........................
C. Police misconduct is not a superseding cause of
injury where the injury is a foreseeable consequence
of involving the police; an erroneousjury
instructiondoes not result in prejudice where there
exists no likelihood that the jury believed the
defendant, yet ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Pool
v. City of Oakland....................................
D. No right of actionfor lost economic advantage is
recognizedfor interference by one equestrian
harness race driver with the horse of another
during a racefor prize money: Youst v. Longo ......
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. In a case where public agency's constructionproject
substantially differed from that depicted in its
EnvironmentalImpact Report, the 180-day time limit for
filing a complaint against the agency tolls not at date of
the project's commencement, but upon the plaintiff's
receipt of actual or constructive notice of the project's
nonconformity to the previously filed Environmental
Impact Report: Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v.
32nd District Agricultural Ass'n.

In Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa v. 32nd District Agricultural
Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 929, 727 P.2d 1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986), the
State of California's 32nd District Agricultural Association [hereinafter the District], which was authorized to carry out construction,
maintenance, and operations at the Orange County Fairgrounds,
planned to construct an amphitheater upon the fairgrounds. The
District, pursuant to section 21141(a) of the California Environmental
Quality Act [hereinafter CEQA], CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21193
(West 1986), properly provided for a public hearing and prepared an
environmental impact report [hereinafter EIR] on the proposed project. Section 21151(a) of CEQA requires filing of an EIR whenever a
local agency wishes to commence a construction project which may
have a substantial effect on the surrounding environment.
Subsequently, the District entered into a contract for the construction of the theater. The contract's terms, however, did not conform
to the earlier EIR. In particular, the amount of fixed seating space in
the theater was increased in size from six acres to ten, and the stage
was redirected toward numerous residences.
At no time did the District submit an amended EIR, afford a second public hearing, or give notice to the plaintiffs or anyone else of
the nonconforming nature of the new contract with respect to the
previously filed EIR. Construction of the facility commenced in February of 1983.
After the theater's completion, a concert was held on July 27, 1983
which exceeded county noise level maximums. The plaintiffs then
brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief on January 20,
1984-just under 180 days from the date at which the concert was
held, but more than 180 days from the date of the beginning of
construction.
The primary thrust of the plaintiff's complaint was: first, the District violated section 21166(a) of CEQA's requirement that a subsequent EIR be filed where the proposed development differs
substantially from a previous EIR; and second, the plaintiff should
not be bound by the strict 180-day filing requirement of section
1012
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21167(a) because it had no notice that the construction contract entered by the District varied from the EIR it had filed. The case
reached the supreme court after the District's demurrer to the complaint was granted by the trial court and affirmed on appeal.
Justice Reynoso, speaking for the court, first concluded that the inconsistency between the construction contract for the amphitheater
and the EIR were "substantial" within the meaning of the provision.
The court remarked that the two hundred percent increase in capacity and the resituation of the structure were obviously important and
merited an amended EIR.
The court then turned to the issue of whether the action was timebarred. Section 21167(a) of CEQA requires that actions challenging a
public agency's failure to conform to EIR filing requirements be filed
within 180 days of commencement of the construction project.
The court recognized that the action would clearly not survive a
literal reading of the statute. However, the court expressed concern
that if the action were disallowed one of the underlying purposes of
CEQA, accurately informing the public of proposed developments
which might upset environmental quality, would be contravened.'
The court cited CEQA's public notification requirements found in
sections 21105 and 21108(c) as indicative of the Act's underlying public participation element. The court remarked that the public has a
right to be informed to enable it to make intelligent contributions to
any environmental decisions. The court also noted that the legislature's intent was that CEQA be interpreted broadly in order to effect
its goal of environmental protection.
The court construed the 180-day filing limitation of section 21167(a)
as applying literally only when the public agency performs construction consistent with its previously filed EIR. Where the subsequent
construction differs substantially from the specifications indicated in
its previously filed EIR, an action challenging the proposal may be
brought within 180 days of the date on which the plaintifffirst acquired notice, whether actual or constructive, of the nonconforming
nature of the actual development.
The court's holding seems intuitively fair with respect to plaintiffs
seeking to challenge activity potentially damaging to their health and
safety interests. It would be unjust to require plaintiffs in such cases
to adhere to a strict filing limitation tolled by the date of commencement of construction when they have every reason to believe the development will be in line with the previously filed EIR.
The majority's position is especially applicable to drawn out con1013

struction projects. Complainants in those instances would ordinarily
receive no visible indication of the project's nonconforming nature
until after the 180-day period had elapsed. Application of the literal
filing requirement in such cases would therefore be particularly unjust. See also Hoffinger, Environmental Impact Statements: Instruments for Environmental Protection or Endless Litigation?, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527 (1983).
MITCHELL F. DISNEY

B. Mentally incapacitatedminors, who have parents or
guardians,are not allowed to invoke a tolling statute in
filing a tort claim against the state. Nevertheless, they
are entitled to file the claim within one year of the
accrual of the cause of action if they were a minor for
the entire 100-day claim limit period and the delay in
filing was not attributableto any lack of diligence on the
part of the minor: Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles.
In Hernandez v. County of Los Angeles, 42 Cal. 3d 1020, 728 P.2d
1154, 232 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1986), the court considered two issues regarding application of the California Tort Claims Act. CAL. GOV'T
CODE, §§ 900-996.6 (West 1980). First, the court considered whether a
tolling provision which extends the 100 day claim filing limit applied
to minors who were mentally incapacitated. (Section 911.4 of the
Government Code provides that the 100-day claim filing limitation
does not start to run until a guardian or conservator is appointed to
act on behalf of the mentally incapacitated person.) Second, the
court considered whether a minor plaintiff should be allowed an extended filing time of one year from the accrual of his cause of action
when the reason for the late filing can be attributed to the neglect of
the attorney or parent of the plaintiff.
In the present case, the plaintiff suffered mental retardation and
physical handicaps due to the alleged negligence of Los Angeles
County Hospital while he was under its care during his birth. After
the mother of the plaintiff consulted an attorney, an application to
file a late claim was prepared and served on the county several
months after the 100-day claim limitation had elapsed. CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 911.2 (West 1980). The county denied the application on the
grounds that it was filed late. The plaintiff then petitioned the court,
requesting relief from the claim filing requirements per section 946.6
of the Government Code, asserting that the County had improperly
denied the plaintiff's late claim. The trial court and the court of appeal both rejected the plaintiff's contention and denied relief to submit a late claim.
1014
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The supreme court held that section 911.4 of the Government Code
did not apply to minors who had an adult that could act on their behalf, but rather applied only to persons who were mentally incapacitated and required a guardian or conservator. The court reasoned
that the parents were perfectly fit to take the responsibility of filing
a claim for the minor, and that the legislative intent of the statute
was to provide an exception for people who were mentally incapacitated and did not have another person to file their claim for them
(e.g., a mentally incapacitated single adult would not have someone to
file a claim for him, whereas a mentally incapacitated minor would
have his parents to protect his interests).
As to the second issue, however, the court held that the late-claim
application of the plaintiff had to be accepted if it was made within
one year of the accrual of the cause of action and the plaintiff was a
minor during the entire 100-day period. The court found that the legislature had intended to accord special consideration to minors that
were in the minority during the full 100-day term and that they
should be permitted to file a late claim as long as it was within a year
of the accrual of the cause of action. Minors are thus treated more
favorably than adults who are permitted to file late claims due to
mistake, surprise, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. The court cited
numerous cases that had followed this legislative intent. See generally 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Actions §§ 204-208 (3d ed.
1985). Additionally, the court stated that neglect on the part of the
parents or attorney of the minor was not a proper basis for denial of
the claim.
In sum, as to the first issue, the court held that a mentally incapacitated minor that had adults capable of acting on his behalf was not
entitled to a tolling of the 100-day claim limitation because of the
mental incapacitation tolling provision of section 911.4 of the Government Code. As to the second issue, the court held that since the
plaintiff was a minor for the entire 100-day period in which the claim
could have been filed initially, the late filing was within one year of
the accrual of the cause of action, and the delay in filing was not attributable to the minor plaintiff, the court must accept the late claim.
Therefore, the trial court erred in refusing to grant the plaintiff
relief.
JAMES A. COULTER, III

1015

C.

Dismissal of a party's motion for trial de novo based
solely on that party'sfailure to offer evidence at a
mandatory arbitrationproceeding was improper: Lyons v.
Wickhorst.

In Lyons v. Wickhorst, 42 Cal. 3d 911, 727 P.2d 1019, 231 Cal. Rptr.
738 (1986), the court was faced with choosing between preserving a
party's interest in having his cause receive judicial consideration on
the merits, and undermining the legitimacy of California's requirement of court-ordered arbitration of minor claims. The plaintiff had
brought an action for unlawful arrest and false imprisonment against
the defendant in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Because
the relief sought in the action did not exceed $25,000, the court, pursuant to section 1141.11 of the Civil Procedure Code, ordered
mandatory arbitration of the cause. On the eve of the arbitration
hearing, the plaintiff announced his intent not to offer any evidence
at the hearing and, in fact, presented none. The superior court slated
a second arbitration proceeding with a new arbitrator. Again, the
plaintiff failed to present any evidence. The defendant, in light of
the plaintiff's recalcitrance to proceed, made no effort to appear.
The arbitrator entered an award for the defendant. The plaintiff
then moved for a trial de novo. The court refused the plaintiff's request pursuant to motion by the defendant.
Chief Justice Bird, speaking for the court, commenced her opinion
by noting that section 581 of the Civil Procedure Code, relied upon by
the trial court in dismissing the motion, was inapplicable. That provision sets out various grounds for involuntary dismissal, which range
from a plaintiff's abandonment of a claim, to failure to appear at trial
by one or both parties. The Chief Justice observed that none of these
circumstances were present in the instant case.
The majority next took up the question of whether the trial court
could dismiss the motion based on its inherent discretionary authority to do so. The court uncovered precedent recognizing two situations in which a trial court's exercise of discretion to dismiss motions
for new trial was deemed proper. The first basis-a fictitious or
sham complaint-was clearly inapplicable. The other basis, codified
at section 583.410 of the Civil Procedure Code, was similarly rejected.
Dismissal under that provision is warranted if a plaintiff fails to prosecute an action in a timely manner.
A companion section, section 583.420, enumerates several specific
grounds for dismissal. Each situation listed in section 583.420 requires a temporal delay of at least two years in either service of process or bringing the case to trial. These circumstances were not
present in the instant case and thus the court found failure to prosecute to be an unsatisfactory basis for dismissal. In addition to point1016
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ing out the absence of any other miscellaneous grounds for
involuntary dismissal, the court noted that California courts have traditionally endeavored to guard the policy of extending to parties the
opportunity to have their cases tried on the merits. The court further noted that involuntary dismissal has been viewed with distaste
as a drastic measure by the federal judiciary as well.
Finally, the majority opinion suggested that the legislature had impliedly refused to authorize the use of involuntary dismissal as a penalty in cases like this. After calling attention to the fact that the
legislature had provided for sanctions (in the form of increased costs
and attorney fees for nonparticipation in arbitration proceedings)
when it amended section 128.5 of the Civil Procedure Code to apply
to arbitration proceedings, the court concluded that the lawmakers
must have regarded this economic deterrent to be sufficient. The majority inferred that the legislature's refusal to incorporate various
prerequisites to appeal, like those found in statutes governing small
claims court practice, demonstrated legislative intent to maintain an
unimpeded avenue to a new trial for plaintiffs who refuse to participate in mandatory arbitration proceedings. The court concluded that
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was
clearly improper under the circumstances.
While the court's decision constitutes a refusal to "put teeth into"
the California arbitration scheme, it is laudable for its preservation of
the interest of parties in receiving consideration of their claims on
the merits. Less acceptable, however, is the court's utter failure to
take into account the apparently willful nature of the plaintiff's refusal to submit to the arbitration procedure. Dismissal under these
circumstances seems warranted and the court's failure to recognize
an exception is disturbing. See 1 CAL. JUR. 3D Actions § 238 (1972);
AM. JUR. 2D Arbitrationand Award § 9 (1962).
MITCHELL

F.

DISNEY

D. Statements made during settlement negotiations may not
be privilegedfor the purposes of a subsequent actionfor
abuse of process: Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg,
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc.
In Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss and
Karma, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d 1157, 728 P.2d 1202, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1986)
[hereinafter Oren and Greenberg, respectively], the supreme court
held that statements made during settlement negotiations may not be
1017

privileged for the purposes of a subsequent action for abuse of process. Oren had begun construction of a residential development
which displeased an adjoining property owner. Greenberg brought a
halt to the development by bringing suit under the California Environmental Quality Act [hereinafter CEQA] challenging the environmental impact report which the city used in approving the
construction plan. Oren then filed suit for abuse of process, based on
the settlement offer made by Greenberg during the course of negotiations. Greenberg claimed that such statements were privileged under
section 47(2) of the California Civil Code.
In analyzing the application of section 47(2), the court distinguished the present case from Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski, 133
Cal. App. 3d 832, 184 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1982). In Asia Investment, the
court held that statements made during the course of settlement negotiations were considered to have been made during the course of
judicial proceedings. As such, under section 47(2), the statements
were privileged when a plaintiff sought to use the statements directly
to show injury, as in an action for libel or slander. The court found,
however, if a plaintiff brought another tort cause of action, such as
abuse of process, the statements made during the course of negotiations were not privileged and may have therefore been offered as an
element of proof.
The court further explained that in asserting a cause of action for
abuse of process, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant instituted the process for an ulterior purpose; and (2) that the defendant
committed a willful act to accomplish a purpose other than that for
which the process was designed. See also 72 C.J.S. Process § 106-07
(1987). In this case, Oren was allowed to prove the first elementulterior purpose-by introducing the settlement offer made by defense attorneys to the effect that the CEQA action would be dropped
if the price was right. However, the court refused to infer the second
element-a misapplication of process-from this showing of ulterior
purpose. The court was thus forced to conclude that the complaint
did not state allegations sufficient to maintain a cause of action for
abuse of process.
This decision was made primarily on procedural grounds. In dictum, however, the court avowed that statements that are privileged
in a defamation action would not enjoy the same privilege in an action for malicious prosecution. The court suggested that if the plaintiffs had amended their complaint to allege malicious prosecution,
the case might have been decided differently, thereby offering future
plaintiffs in similar situations information as to how to frame their
complaint.
RHONDA SCHMIDT

1018
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II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

Where a prison inmate is accused of a prison rule
violation based solely on confidential information, an in
camera proceeding at which the hearing officer could test
the veracity of the source is not required by federal or
state due process: In re Jackson.

In In re Jackson, 43 Cal. 3d 501, 731 P.2d 36, 233 Cal. Rptr. 911
(1987), the supreme court held that neither federal nor state due process required state prison hearing officers to conduct in camera interviews of confidential informants before finding an accused prisoner
guilty of a disciplinary violation solely on the basis of information
provided by that informant. The court stated that under state due
process an in camera review was unnecessary, absent sufficient evidence that such a process was feasible. Further, the court found current administrative regulations met due process requirements where
a reviewing court could conclude from the disciplinary record information that the hearing officer made a valid determination of the informant's reliability and truthfulness.
In this case, the defendant had been found guilty of a prison rule
violation for force and violence under title 15 section 3005 (b) of the
Administrative Code on the basis of statements by three confidential
informants. After exhausting administrative remedies, his petition
for writ of habeas corpus was granted by the Superior Court of Marin
County. The trial court found that an in camera interview was necessary before guilt could be found whenever an inmate was accused of
a prison violation based solely on confidential information. The court
of appeal denied the People's application for a stay, and the supreme
court reversed upon review.
The supreme court pointed out that the competing interests of a
confidential informant's safety and the inmates' rights to fair disciplinary hearings rendered the question presented in this case an important one. Analysis focused first on the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). There,
the Court rejected the idea that federal due process required that reliability of confidential informants in prison disciplinary hearings be
tested in camera. The rationale was that the need for order in prisons and for encouraging and protecting inmate informants were legitimate concerns. Therefore, only minimal due process protection need
be given a disciplinary defendant.
The court here found further support for its position when it ex-

1019

amined similar federal and state court cases decided subsequent to
Wolff. The court cited many cases that either followed Wolff or rejected the use of in camera testing wherein due process was deemed
satisfied by disciplinary board interviews of the reporting prison
guard or by reviews of confidential files which supplied sufficient information to support a finding that the information received was reliable. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Hall, 520 F.2d 382, 385 (1st Cir. 1975);
Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 545-46 (5th Cir. 1981); Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1984); Niday v. State, 353 N.W.2d 92, 93-94
(Iowa 1984). In addition, the court stated that it saw no expansion of
due process protections by the high court beyond Wolff since it was
decided.
Turning to state due process requirements, the court explained
that the analysis necessitated a balancing approach to assess procedural safeguards in light of the governmental and private interests
involved. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 7 cl. (a), 15. The court applied
the four-factor test developed in People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260,
599 P.2d 622, 158 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1979). This test weighed the defendant's private and dignitary interests and risk of their deprivation
against governmental interests in the function involved and fiscal
and administrative burdens of the procedure in question.
The court acknowledged that the defendant's private interests in
duration and conditions of confinement were significantly affected by
the disciplinary board's findings. However, administrative provisions
providing the defendant with written notice of the charge, an impartial hearing, and a limited right to confrontation at the hearing were
deemed to satisfy the defendant's dignitary interests. In addition, the
court saw minimal risk of deprivation of rights where there was a
valid reliability determination.
Finally, in applying the Ramirez test, the court found the government's interest in maintaining discipline, order, and safety of all inmates, and its need to utilize confidential informants to be the most
salient considerations. The court concluded that because the defendant did not supply sufficient evidence of feasibility of the in camera
procedure proposed, the likelihood that governmental interests could
be unduly burdened by the in camera scheme was not sufficiently
disproved. Thus, the balance of factors favored the government's position, such that no due process violation for failure to conduct an in
camera hearing was found.
In sum, the supreme court ruled that present administrative regulations were constitutionally sound where a reviewing court could
conclude from the disciplinary record information that the hearing
officer's determination of the informant's reliability was valid. The
court left open the possibility that a proponent could demonstrate

1020
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that an in camera procedure was feasible. Under the instant facts,
however, the court found no constitutional requirement that state
prison officers conduct in camera interviews of confidential informants when determining the guilt of a disciplinary defendant based
solely on that informant's statements.
SARAH

A.

FUHRMAN

B. Persons charged with contempt for violation of an
injunction or order in "red light" abatement actions are
entitled to a jury trial under the California Constitution;
a defendant is guilty of separatecontempts for each day
the injunction is violated: Mitchell v. Superior Court.
In Mitchell v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 107, 729 P.2d 212, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 900 (1987), the supreme court decided whether defendants were
entitled to a trial by jury when charged with contempt for not complying with an injunction issued pursuant to section 11229 of the Penal Code [hereinafter section 11229]. Section 11229 was a provision of
the Red Light Abatement Law [hereinafter the Red Light Law].
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11225-11235 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). Under
the Red Light Law, places of illegal gambling, lewdness, and prostitution are prohibited and defined as a nuisance. The court held that
contempt under section 11229 was criminal and, therefore, the defendants had a right to trial by jury under article I section 16 of the
California Constitution. The supreme court's decision annulled the
contempt judgments of the Superior Court of San Francisco County.
In addition, the supreme court determined that in the case of retrial,
each charge of contempt under section 11229 would be counted by the
number of days the injunction had been violated.
In Mitchell, the defendants were the proprietors of a San Francisco
theater which provided films and live acts charged as being lewd and
obscene "adult" entertainment. The theater was the object of a preliminary injunction issued in 1981 pursuant to an action brought by
the People for violations of the Red Light Law. The contempt proceedings were initiated when police declared that the injunction had
been violated over a four day period. See generally 14 CAL. JUR. 3D
Contempt §§ 25, 43, 44 (1974); 38 CAL. JUR. 3D Injunctions § 96 (1977).
The trial court agreed, finding multiple violations, and ruled that
each lewd act between a performer and a patron was a separate contempt. Fines totaling over $62,000 were imposed, and the defendants
were sentenced to six months in the county jail.
1021

The supreme court first addressed the defendants' contention that
they were entitled to a jury trial. Finding that section 11229's purpose was to punish the defendants for past conduct and that the punishment was equivalent to that for a misdemeanor, the court
determined that contempt under section 11229 was criminal in
nature.
The court declined to decide whether a right to jury trial existed
under the United States Constitution because it found no clear answer where both fines and a six month jail sentence were imposed, as
in the instant case. However, the court stated that under the California Constitution a right to trial by jury was guaranteed in all criminal
offenses above the level of infraction. See also Mills v. Municipal
Court, 10 Cal. 3d 288, 515 P.2d 273, 110 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1973). The
court reasoned that because the defendants were found to have committed criminal contempt above the level of infraction, they were
within the scope of the state constitutional guarantee and, therefore,
were entitled to a jury trial. See generally 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 15 (1978).
The court also considered matters pertinent to a possible retrial.
Dismissing the defendants' claim that the evidence of contempt was
insufficient and therefore barred retrial, the court addressed whether
the conduct underlying the contempt charges could be punished as
multiple contempts.
The court examined Reliable Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court,
158 Cal. App. 3d 604, 204 Cal. Rptr. 786 (1984), in which multiple violations of an injunction were measured by individual lewd acts committed by patrons on the premises of an "adult" bookstore. In
Reliable, the court of appeal reasoned as follows: contempt is an insult to the authority of the court; each separate lewd act is an act of
disobedience and an insult to the court; therefore, contempt is properly measured by the number of separate lewd acts. The supreme
court criticized Reliable for analyzing contempt in a general sense
rather than in connection with specific prohibitions under the law.
The court disapproved Reliable to the extent that it was inconsistent
with the court's holding.
The court next found the number of contempts limited by section
654 of the Penal Code, prohibiting punishment for the same act
under more than one provision of the Penal Code. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 654 (West 1970) (subsequently amended in 1976 and 1977 (West
Supp. 1987)). Deciding that there was more than a single act, the
court stated that the harm the law sought to prevent was public nuisance. The court noted that under section 373a of the Penal Code,
where the conduct in question is a public nuisance, a separate offense
is committed for each day the conduct occurs. CAL. PENAL CODE
1022
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§ 373a (West 1970). Therefore, while each separate act could not
count as a contempt, the court was bound to enumerate contempts by
each of the four days the injunction was disobeyed.
Thus, the supreme court held that the violation of an injunction,
issued pursuant to the law, was criminal contempt under section
11229 and therefore, the defendants were entitled to a jury trial. The
court also determined that a defendant may be charged with a separate act of contempt for each day violations occur.
SARAH A. FUHRMAN

C. A black criminal defendant is not deprived of his sixth
amendment right to an impartialjury where a branch
court limits its juror selection pool to only a portion of a
county, despite the fact that the portion includes
demographicallyfewer blacks than does the county as a
whole: O'Hare v. Superior Court.
In O'Hare v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 86, 729 P.2d 766, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 332 (1987), the court analyzed the validity of the North San Diego County Superior Court's practice of selecting jurors solely from
the North County Judicial District, instead of from San Diego
County as a whole. O'Hare, a black man, alleged that since the demographic makeup of the North San Diego County included fewer
blacks than did San Diego County in its entirety, the jurors drawn
for his criminal trial would not represent a fair cross-section of the
community. As a result, he averred that his sixth amendment right
to an impartial jury was denied.
O'Hare sought a writ of mandate from the court of appeal to compel the North County Superior Court to transfer his case to the
downtown San Diego courthouse. The court of appeal refused to
grant O'Hare's motion. The supreme court, adopting the opinion of
the court of appeal, framed the question to be decided as "what constitutes the 'relevant community' from which a fair cross-section
must be drawn to comprise the venire." Id. at 93, 729 P.2d at 769-70,
233 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
The court first noted that defendants who undergo criminal trials
in the North County court were not denied the sixth amendment
right to a "jury of the vicinage," since all of the jurors would be
drawn from the vicinity in which the crime took place. See People v.
Jones, 9 Cal. 3d 546, 551, 510 P.2d 705, 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 349
(1973). The decision emphasized that O'Hare had alleged no proce1023

dural deficiencies in the North County court's selection process. Possible procedural deficiencies might have included the use of voter
registration lists to select veniremen or the granting of discretion to
jury selection officials to exclude some demographic portions of the
district. Additionally, O'Hare made no allegations that the North
County Judicial District was gerrymandered to minimize jury participation by black citizens. The court implied that the use of these tactics would have violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights.
The court analogized O'Hare's challenge to attacks which have
been raised against the federal judiciary. Subdivisions of federal judicial districts have been alleged to yield venires unrepresentative of
the demographics of the district as a whole. The court indicated that
such challenges have generally been unsuccessful. See, e.g., United
States v. Gottfried, 165 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948). Based on this analogy
to the federal judiciary, the California Supreme Court dispensed with
the notion that the North County Superior Court's venire must parallel the demographics of all of San Diego County.
O'Hare's assertion that only the state legislature may authorize the
enstatement of judicial subdistricts was a more challenging issue.
O'Hare pointed out that while the legislature had expressly authorized the creation of subdistricts in Los Angeles County, it had not
done so with respect to San Diego County. O'Hare contended that
since the North County subdistrict was established by local court
rule, it was illegitimate, and therefore, the only constitutional jury
venire in San Diego County was the county in its entirety. In response, the court cited section 206a of the Code of Civil Procedure
which grants flexibility in the drawing of districts and authorizes
judges to do the drawing. The court concluded that the enstatement
of a North San Diego County District venire was as authorized by the
legislature as were its counterparts in Los Angeles County.
Finally, the court distinguished the case of Johnson v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 85, 209 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1984), which disapproved limiting the selection of a jury venire to the applicable supervisorial district. The court noted that the supervisorial district
involved in Johnson was substantially smaller in size and population
than the North County District. Moreover, the supervisorial district's boundaries in Johnson were not coextensive with those of the
court. The O'Hare court recognized that under such circumstances
the jurors sitting in a particular case might not be drawn from the
area in which the crime was committed. As a result, the defendant
would be deprived of his sixth amendment right to a "jury of the vicinage." The court put to rest O'Hare's contention by pointing out that
the North County Court boundaries were coextensive with the area
encompassing the venire. Therefore, no sixth amendment infringe1024
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ment danger was posed by the North County Court's juror selection
scheme.
MITCHELL

D.

F.

DISNEY

The failure of counsel to present mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase of a capital trial, although at the
express request of the defendant, is a deprivation of the
right to the effective assistanceof counsel, and is
reversible error on a judgment of death: People v. Bloyd.
I. . INTRODUCTION
1

In People v. Bloyd, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction of Dale Michael Bloyd for the murder of his live-in girlfriend and her father. The couple had been living with her father at
the time of the murders. The imposition of the death penalty entered under the 1978 law2 was reversed because of defense counsel's
failure at the penalty phase of the trial to present mitigating evidence. 3 The court agreed that the evidence was sufficient to support
the finding of premeditation and deliberation in the killing of the father (first degree murder), and the court found that the defendant
killed the female victim (second degree murder).4 After reviewing
the defendant's allegations of ineffective counsel in the petition of
habeas corpus,5 the court held that the defendant's rights were not
6
violated.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of April 27, 1981, Martha Jones and her
father, William North, were shot to death in their mobile home. 7
The scene described by Yuba County Sheriff's deputies indicated execution-style killings: both were shot in the head at close range with
a large caliber weapon. 8 A forensic pathologist testified that there
1. 43 Cal. 3d 333, 729 P.2d 802, 233 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1987). Justice Panelli wrote the
opinion of the court, and was joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justices Mosk, Broussard, Grodin, and Lucas. Justice Reynoso concurred in the result.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.2 (West Supp. 1986).
3. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 340, 729 P.2d at 805, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 370-71.
4. Id at 347-50, 729 P.2d at 810-12, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 378-80.
5. Id. at 362-64, 729 P.2d at 820, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
6. Id. at 364, 729 P.2d at 821, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
7. Id at 340-41, 729 P.2d at 805, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
8. Id.

1025

was no evidence of struggle by Martha, and that North could not
have been standing when he was shot. The pathologist also opined
that Martha's wound was not self-inflicted and that the killer was
standing over a kneeling North when he shot him in the back of the
head.9
Donald North and Martha's daughter, Rebecca, both testified that
Martha and the defendant had been arguing the night before the
murders. The argument concerned the defendant's nine-month-old
son from a previous marriage.' 0 Donald was present when the shootings occurred but, because of a hearing impairment, was not awakened and suspected nothing until discovering the bodies the next
morning." Rebecca testified that her mother owned a gun of the
same caliber as that used in the killings, and that her mother had
2
taken a prescription of valium the afternoon of her death.1
Two days later, the defendant was apprehended. After receiving
his Miranda warnings, he made two compatible statements detailing
his version of the events that occurred on the morning of the
murders.' 3 Basically, the defendant maintained that Martha had shot
her father and then turned the pistol on the defendant. Following a
brief skirmish, the gun went off in Martha's face.' 4 The gun dropped
to the ground, the defendant stepped over the bodies, picked up his
i5
son, and left in Martha's automobile
At the trial, the prosecution proceeded primarily on circumstantial
evidence in its effort to obtain a first degree murder verdict. To support the theory that the killing of North was deliberate and premeditated, the prosecution pointed to convincing ballistic and forensic
evidence.
The copper jacket of the bullet that killed North was found resting
on Martha's fallen body, thus indicating the killer fired on North after killing Martha. This evidence, taken with the considerable inconsistencies in the defendant's story, was sufficient for the jury to
return a guilty verdict for the first degree murder of North and the
6
second degree murder of Martha.'
9. Id. at 342, 729 P.2d at 806, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
10. Id. at 342-43, 729 P.2d at 806-07, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
11. Id
12. Id.
13. Bloyd claimed he retired before midnight, contradicting the testimony of Donald and Rebecca. Id. Surprised by a gunshot, Bloyd awoke to find Martha attacking
him, and acting in self-defense, accidentally forced Martha to shoot herself. Martha
was 5 feet 8 inches tall and 107 pounds, while Bloyd weighed around 250 pounds. Id. at
349, 729 P.2d at 811, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 376. The relative sizes of Martha and Bloyd rendered this purported self-inflicted shooting questionable.
14. Id. at 343-44, 729 P.2d at 807, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
15. Id at 346, 729 P.2d at 808, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
16. Id. at 346, 729 P.2d at 809, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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Neither the prosecution nor the defense presented evidence at the
penalty phase of the trial.17 In response to the writ of habeas corpus,
defense counsel filed an affidavit stating that the failure to present
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase was the result of, and in ac18
cordance with, the express desires of the defendant.
III.
A.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT

Guilt Phase Issues

In a concise opinion, Justice Panelli addressed the contentions of
the defendant that error occurred during the guilt phase of the trial.
The court summarily dismissed the arguments of the defendant.19
Finding no prejudice in the exclusion of several prospective jurors,
Justice Panelli turned to an analysis of the sufficiency of the evi20
dence presented.
The issue facing the court was whether the evidence, when viewed
in the light most favorable to the People, was such that a reasonable
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.21 Drawing upon the logical inferences flowing from the
evidence, the court had little trouble in accepting the jury's conclusions that the defendant killed North with premeditation and deliberation. The court pointed out that the test for first degree murder is
reflection on the part of the defendant; such reflection was found to
22
have occurred here.
As to Martha's murder, the defendant maintained that there was
no evidence of malice introduced as required for a finding of second
degree murder. The court, citing its previous decision in People v.
Lines,2 3 rejected the notion that the defendant's accident/self-defense
story was the favored construction of events. Supporting the contrary position, the court affirmed that when it is proved that the defendant has killed, the law presumes it was malicious and an act of
murder, in the absence of other evidence. 24 The court found that the
instructions to the jury were proper and that its verdict was suffi17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
Cal. 3d

Id. at 364, 729 P.2d at 821, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
Id.
Id. at 346, 729 P.2d at 809, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
Id.
Id. at 346-47, 729 P.2d at 809, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
Id. at 348, 729 P.2d at 810, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
13 Cal. 3d 500, 505, 531 P.2d 793, 796-97, 119 Cal. Rptr. 225, 228 (1975).
Bloyd 43 Cal. 3d at 348, 729 P.2d at 810, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (citing Lines, 13
at 505, 531 P.2d at 796-97, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 228).
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ciently supported. 25 The court determined that the trial court ruled
properly in dismissing the defense's motion for acquittal based on insufficient evidence.26
The court held that any errors committed by the lower court were
de minimis.27 Observing that a copy of the instructions accompanied
the jurors into deliberation, and that they were cautioned twice on
the range of permissible conclusions inferable from circumstantial
28
evidence, the court found no reasonable probability of prejudice.
The written instructions defining malice, excusable homicide, self-defense, and manslaughter were found to be proper, whether considered individually or cumulatively.29 The allegation offered by the
defendant, that the descriptive titles of the written instructions may
have misled the jurors, was dismissed as untenable and without sup30
porting authority.
The defendant also asserted that the ballistics expert at the trial
was unqualified to offer testimony relating to the trajectory of the
bullets.31 However, the court disagreed, choosing to accept the trial
court's determination that his expertise with exterior ballistics was
32
sufficient for him to answer questions.
Further, the court found that the defendant had not been denied
his constitutional right to be present at trial,3 3 or his right to counsel.34 The defendant claimed that the admission into evidence of a
bottle of valium--discovered in Martha's housecoat-and the rereading of certain testimony to the jury outside the presence of the defendant denied him such rights. 35 The court held that the defendant
must have been absent from a portion of the trial having a "'reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge.'"36 The defendant had not met his burden to
37
show that the absence prejudiced his defense.
B.

Special CircumstanceIssue

The only complaint stemming from the special circumstance
charges arose from the prosecution's failure to file duplicative
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 350, 729 P.2d at 812, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 351, 729 P.2d at 812, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
Id at 351-52, 729 P.2d at 812-13, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78.
Id. at 352-56, 729 P.2d at 813-16, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 378-81.

30. Id. at 355-56, 729 P.2d at 815-16, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
31. Id. at 357-58, 729 P.2d at 816-17, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 381-82.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
court).

Id.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 358-59, 729 P.2d at 817-18, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 882-83.
Id. at 359-60, 729 P.2d at 818-19, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 383-84 (citations omitted by

37. Id. at 360-61, 729 P.2d at 818-20, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
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charges by inverting the names of Martha and North.3s However,
this omission was in harmony with the court's holding in People v.
Harris,39 proscribing the use of redundant special circumstance allegations. The Bloyd court decided that there had been no juror confusion as the special circumstance issues were not sent to the jury until
40
a verdict had been reached on the murder counts.
C.

Petitionfor Writ of Habeas Corpus

In a petition for habeas corpus consolidated with the appeal, the
defendant maintained that he was denied the effective assistance of
counsel at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial.41 The alleged
inadequacies of counsel at the guilt phase were directed at the investigation into Martha's physical condition and state of mind at the
time of her death. 42 The defendant alleged that the failure of his
counsel to consider the implications of her ingestion of liquor and
valium deprived him of an important aspect of his defense. 4 3 The
court found the defendant unpersuasive in establishing a prejudicial
mistake resulting from his counsel's failure to pursue these
44
matters.
Finally, the court discussed the adequacy of counsel at the penalty
phase.45 The defendant claimed that by failing to present available
mitigating evidence, albeit in deference to the wishes of the defendant, his counsel provided ineffective assistance.46 The court followed
the rule established in People v. Deere,47 agreeing that the failure of
defense counsel to present any mitigating evidence in the penalty
phase of a capital trial requires the penalty to be set aside. The court,
therefore, found that a prima facie case for relief had been established.48 The court granted the petition for habeas corpus; the defendant was then resentenced to life in prison without possibility of
38. Id. at 361-62, 729 P.2d at 819-20, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
39. 36 Cal. 3d 36, 679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984).
40. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 362, 729 P.2d at 820, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
41. Id.
42. Id at 363, 729 P.2d at 820, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 363-64, 729 P.2d at 820-21, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
45. Id. at 364, 729 P.2d at 821, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
46. Sympathetic factors included the facts that Bloyd's parents were heavy drinkers-defendant was provided with little backing or support; that Bloyd's father had
died; and that because of his parents' separation, Bloyd had been unable to attend college on a football scholarship because of his inability to bear the additional costs. Id.
47. 41 Cal. 3d 353, 710 P.2d 925, 222 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1986).
48. Bloyd, 43 Cal. 3d at 364, 729 P.2d at 821, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
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parole. 49
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fourth in a series of same day, eleventh-hour reversals of
death sentences by the Bird Court, Bloyd seems little more than a
refutation of capital punishment in contravention of prevailing public
opinion. 50 But it is more than that. Affirming the conclusion of the
court in Deere, a bright line is draw i for the presentation of mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Basically, all relevant factors will
be considered before the ultimate penalty is imposed; however, in assuring this protection, the court may have created a defense loophole.
A capital defendant may now order counsel not to present mitigating
evidence, and counsel's compliance is sufficient to trigger the Deere!
Bloyd rule on appeal. The defendant thereby arrives at the preferred
destination: a lifetime address at San Quentin, rather than a temporary box on death row.
TRAVIS P. CLARDY

E.

To show a denial of the right to the effective assistanceof
counsel on a petition of habeas corpus, a condemned
defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced the outcome of the proceeding:
People v. Ledesma.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Ledesma,1 the defendant, Fermin Rodriguez Ledesma,
petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus, having been found
guilty of the robbery, kidnapping, and murder of a gasoline station
attendant, 2 and sentenced to death by a Santa Clara jury. The appeal
was automatic. 3 The appellate record was inadequate (due to the
very incompetence of counsel from which he sought relief); it was
therefore rejected by the court as being unable to support his ap49. Id. at 364, 729 P.2d at 822, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
50. See B. WITKIN, 2 CALIFORNIA CRIMES §§ 947A-947R, 1029-1044 (Supp. 1985).
1. 43 Cal. 3d 171, 729 P.2d 839, 233 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1987). The majority opinion

was written by Justice Mosk, with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Broussard and Reynoso concurring. Justice Mosk, after reaching the final decision, added a separate concurring opinion. Justice Grodin authored a separate concurring opinion in which he

was joined by Justices Lucas and Panelli.
2. Ledesma was convicted of first degree murder, kidnapping, and two counts of
robbery; also special circumstances allegations of the intentional killing of a witness,

felony-murder robbery, and felony-murder kidnapping. Id. at 176, 729 P.2d at 840, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 405.
3. Section 1239(b) of the California Penal Code provides for the automatic appeal
of the death sentence. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West Supp. 1987).

1030

California Supreme Court Survey

[Vol. 14: 1007, 1987]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

peal.4 Turning to the writ of habeas corpus, the court addressed the
issue of whether the defendant received ineffective assistance of
5
counsel and, finding in the affirmative, vacated the conviction.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On August 26, 1978, two men rode into a Hudson Oil Company gasoline station in San Jose armed with a handgun. They robbed the attendant, Gabriel Flores. Flores noted the license plate number as
they fled, later giving it to the police along with a description of the
robbers. 6 A registration check established that the motorcycle belonged to the defendant. Proceeding to the listed address, police encountered Ledesma's former girlfriend. She provided further
information which led them to the defendant's residence. After brief
surveillance, three uniformed police officers approached the duplex
and informed the occupants they were looking for the defendant. After being told of his absence, they entered the apartment without a
warrant to conduct a search. After an unsuccessful search, a telephone call to the defendant's residence was intercepted by one of the
officers, who identified herself as one of the occupants. The caller,
apparently Ledesma, said he was "hot" and knew the police were after him.7
After three days, a police investigator presented six photographs to
Flores including one of Ledesma. Flores chose the defendant's photograph as the only one resembling the robber. Later that day he affirmed that the photograph of Ledesma depicted the "one who had
the gun and took the money."8 A week later, the police responded to
calls from customers at the Hudson station and found the station
open but apparently abandoned. Flores was scheduled to be on duty.
On September 8, Flores' body was discovered, bearing four gunshots
and several stab wounds. Beyond Flores' identification, no eyewitness or physical evidence linked Ledesma to the crimes.
Apprehended and charged upon returning to San Jose in March of
1979, Ledesma was represented at the preliminary hearing by a deputy public defender.9 However, the defendant soon made the deci4. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 218, 729 P.2d at 869, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
5. Id. at 227, 729 P.2d at 875, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
6. Id. at 176-77, 729 P.2d at 841-42, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
7. Id. at 177, 729 P.2d at 841-42, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 406.
8. Id. at 178, 729 P.2d at 841, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 406-07.
9. Ledesma entered a plea of not guilty and denied the special circumstances allegations. Id. at 178, 729 P.2d at 842, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
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sion to accept the services of Jefferson M. Parrish, Jr., as his retained

defense counsel.1o
III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Deeming the allegations of Ledesma's petition to have established
a prima facie case for relief, the court appointed a retired superior
court judge as referee to make findings responsive to a prepared list
of questions." Following his investigation, the referee concluded
that, because of the closeness of the evidence, Parrish's inadequacies
subjected the defense to prejudice, and accordingly recommended
2
that a new trial be granted for both the guilt and penalty phases.'
For the purpose of its review, the court found it necessary to address only one of the issues raised: whether Parrish failed to provide
the defendant with effective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase
of the trial.13 Justice Mosk offered a distillation of the law affecting
the right of a criminal defendant to the assistance of counsel' 4 as is
15
required by both the United States and California Constitutions.
To warrant a reversal of a conviction or death sentence, the defendant must satisfy two requirements: (1) show that counsel's performance was deficient as measured by an objective professional
standard; and (2) show that counsel's performance prejudiced the de10. Called by the defendant to explain his performance as counsel, Parrish revealed that during the period he represented Ledesma he was obsessed by compulsive
gambling. Id. at 196, 729 P.2d at 854, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 419. This was confirmed by two
social acquaintances of Parrish who, in addition, testified to witnessing him ingest
large quantities of methamphetamine and cocaine, as well as alcohol, and on one occasion smoking PCP. Id. at 197, 729 P.2d at 855, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
11. The six questions addressed, in chronological order, the misadventures of the
trial and were designed to guide Judge Joseph P. Kelly in the investigation into Parrish's preparation and presentation of his case. Id. at 192 n.2, 729 P.2d at 851 n.2, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 416 n.2.
12. The report of the referee found, inter alia, that Parrish failed to pursue the
leads provided in the preliminary report of either the public events of Ledesma's family life or his history of drug abuse; despite two psychosocial reports indicating otherwise, he failed to make further inquiry into the defendant's mental state; he failed to
object to the introduction by the prosecution of anonymous calls identifying Ledesma
as Flores' murderer, the intercepted phone call, or the extrajudicial identification of
Ledesma by the victim; and he failed to research the law and procedure applicable to a
defense of diminished capacity. Id. at 206-14, 729 P.2d at 860-66, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 42631. Parrish contended that he saved his worst performance for the penalty phase; by
his own admission abandoned his client after the jury rendered the guilty verdict. Id.
at 211, 729 P.2d at 864, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
13. Id. at 214, 729 P.2d at 866, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 432. See generally, B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 380A-379N (Supp. 1985).
14. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); People v. Pope, 23 Cal. 3d
412, 422-24, 590 P.2d 859, 864-66, 152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 737-39 (1979). See also Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: Toward a Uniform Framework for Review, 50
Mo. L. REV. 651 (1986).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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fense. 1 6 Generally, prejudice must be affirmatively proved; merely

alleging error is insufficient.17 The defendant must legitimate his
claim of ineffective counsel by a preponderance of the evidence.1s
In determining whether counsel's performance was deficient, a
court must exercise deferential scrutiny for two reasons. First, the
court should avoid the dangers of retrospectively second-guessing attorney performance. 19 Second, the protection provided by counsel
might be undermined by the creation of an environment where the
attorney is more concerned with defending his own action rather
20
than the interests of the client.
Applying the law to the facts found by the referee, the court
quickly moved through the Attorney General's objection that the ref21
eree's report was in error and should not be adopted by the court.
Concerned only with Parrish's trial performance, the court accepted
the referee's finding that Parrish's performance was deficient and
that prejudice to Ledesma resulted. 22 Accordingly, the court vacated
the judgment of conviction and granted the petition for writ of
23
habeas corpus.
IV.

A.

THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

Concurring Opinion of Justice Mosk

After resolving the opinion of the court in favor of the defendant
by speaking to the single issue of the ineffectiveness of trial counsel,
Justice Mosk addressed three other matters unnecessary to the conclusion of the court, yet "potentially meritorious" in demonstrating
24
the glaring incompetence of the defendant's counsel.
Justice Mosk examined the defendant's additional contentions of
Parrish's ineptitude thoroughly. However, in each instance he was
16. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 216-17, 729 P.2d at 867-68, 233 Cal. Rptr. 432-33 (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88).
17. Id. at 217, 729 P.2d at 868, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 434 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693).
18. In re Imbler, 60 Cal. 2d 554, 560, 387 P.2d 6, 8, 35 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296 (1963).
19. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 216, 729 P.2d at 867, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
20. I&
21. Id. at 219, 729 P.2d at 869-70, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 434-35. The Attorney General
attempted to excuse Parrish's incompetence by portraying his shortcomings as a direct
result of the defendant's insistence on using an alibi defense. Id. at 196, 729 P.2d at
853-54, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
22. Id. at 224-27, 729 P.2d at 873-75, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 438-40.
23. Id. at 227, 729 P.2d at 875, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
24. Id. at 228, 729 P.2d at 879, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (Mosk, J., concurring).
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forced by the lack of a complete record to reject the particular point,
though in substance compelling, for the purpose of appellate review.
Parrish failed to object to prosecution's peremptory challenges,
although the available evidence clearly indicated that a group bias
situation as established in People v. Wheeler 25 was a distinct possibility.26 Regarding the introduction into evidence of the intercepted
phone call, Parrish made no attempt to suppress it under the exclusionary rule.27 Moreover, Parrish failed to object to the prosecutorial
misconduct in the repeated comments and questions alluding to the
victim's extrajudicial identification, after receiving a commitment
before the trial that such references would not be made. In so doing,
Parrish not only failed to discharge his duties competently but, in
fact, potentially jeopardized the credibility of the proceedings to such
an extent that Ledesma was effectively precluded from presenting an
appropriate appeal. 28 Ultimately, Justice Mosk reached the "ines29
capable" conclusion that Parrish's counsel was totally inept.
B. Concurring Opinion of Justice Grodin
The theme of Justice Grodin's concurrence centered around the
majority's omission of any discussion regarding the defendant's burden of establishing that counsel's errors caused specific, identifiable
prejudice.3 0 However, while disagreeing with the majority's finding
that the proof of prejudice may be implied in the circumstances surrounding the conviction, Justice Grodin acknowledged that the egregious nature of Parrish's deficiencies promoted a breakdown of the
adversarial process and might possibly have been causative in prejudicing both the verdict and the sentence. 3 '
25. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
26. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 228-32, 729 P.2d at 879-82, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 444-47
(Mosk, J., concurring). It appeared from the record that the prosecutor was removing
prospective jurors based solely on their membership in the Hispanic community, a cognizable group under the Wheeler test. To establish a prima facie case of group discrimination, opposing counsel must preserve on the record, following timely objection,
evidence of the likelihood that persons are being challenged because of their group association. Although the Wheeler issue was raised sua sponte by the trial court, Parrish
neglected to pursue it. Id. at 179-81, 729 P.2d at 842-43, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
27. Id. at 232-36, 729 P.2d at 882-85, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 447-50 (Mosk, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 236-42, 729 P.2d at 885-89, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 450-54 (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Mosk, applying People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 609 P.2d 468, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1980), which required an assignment of misconduct and a timely request for a curative
admonition in order to preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, again believed the
issue would have to be rejected before reaching the merits. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 242,
729 P.2d at 889, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (Mosk, J., concurring).
29. Ledesma, 43 Cal. 3d at 242, 729 P.2d at 889, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 454 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
30. Id. at 242-45, 729 P.2d at 889-91, 233 Cal. Rptr. 454-56 (Grodin, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 245, 729 P.2d at 891, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 456 (Grodin, J., concurring).
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V.

CONCLUSION

If a case could ever be said to be distinguishable on its facts, this
must surely be that case. Though undoubtedly tallied with the other
death sentence reversals of the Bird court, Ledesma presents a scenario that every court, hopefully, would recognize as a gross miscarriage of justice.
In its analysis regarding the plethora of errors, from the warrantless search to the selection of the jury, the court rightfully grounded
its conclusions in well-established law. However, by belaboring the
obvious incompetence of Parrish, the court may have unwittingly created an unwieldy yardstick with which to measure future mistakes.
To imagine a more dramatic display of ineffective counsel is difficult.
Perhaps the length of this opinion can be attributed to that aspect of
human nature that endows us with the gift of narration when dealing
with a simple question sitting squarely in our field of expertise. In
anticipation, the mind is filled with an astounding clarity, a floodgate
of knowledge straining to be released. Like Justice Mosk, many find
that a single response is hardly satisfactory. Like the opinion,
although a simple answer is asked for, it is rarely received.
TRAvis P.
F.

CLARDY

The decision in People v. Harris,holding that the
exclusive use of voter registrationlists in compiling the
jurorpool may result in an unconstitutionally
unrepresentativejury, will not be applied retroactively:
People v. Myers.

In People v. Myers, 43 Cal. 3d 250, 729 P.2d 698, 233 Cal. Rptr. 264
(1987) (plurality opinion), the supreme court reversed and remanded
the appellant's death penalty sentence. The appellant, who was convicted of first degree murder and several other crimes relating to an
armed robbery incident, sought the declaration of mistrial based
upon the court's plurality opinion in People v. Harris, 36 Cal. 3d 36,
679 P.2d 433, 201 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1984). In Harris, the court upheld
Harris's challenge that the use of voter registration lists as the exclusive source of names for compiling a juror pool was unconstitutional
as it deprived him of a representative jury.
Although the appellant did not challenge the jury selection process
until after voir dire examination was completed, the court found that
the challenge was timely, even though such a review may have been
1035

banned had the appellant been tried in federal court. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1867(a), (b) (1977). The court then went on to examine the merits
of retroactive application of Harris. The court invoked the United
States Supreme Court's sixth amendment analysis to determine
whether a decision should be applied retroactively. The relevant factors were as follows: "'(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on
the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice
of a retroactive application of the new standards.'" Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32 (1975) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967)).
In applying the Daniel test, the court found: (a) sixth amendment
rights were to be furthered by the Harris decision; however, it was
incorrect to assume that all criminal defendants were deprived of fair
trials before the Harris decision was rendered; (b) voter registration
lists had been used for decades; therefore, the resulting reliance by
county officials was not unreasonable; and (c) retroactive applications
would be detrimental to the administration of justice, since Harris
merely created a new standard and did not create a per se rule that
all juror pools created exclusively from voter lists were unconstitutional. Thus, the court held that Harris would receive only prospective application.
The appellant successfully challenged several instructions given to
the jury at the penalty phase of the trial. The court concluded that
instructing the jury that the governor had commutation powers-the
so-called "Briggs Instruction"-was improper and prejudicial since
the jury may have decided to impose a harsher sentence to account
for the possibility that the governor might reduce the appellant's sentence. Finally, the court agreed with the appellant's contention that
the failure of the trial court to supplement the death penalty instructions was also prejudicial error. Because the instruction relating to
the death penalty stated that the jury "shall" impose the death sentence if it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the
mitigating, the instruction implied a mechanical weighing process. In
the absence of further instructions making it clear that the jurors
were free to assign whatever weight they deemed appropriate to each
circumstance, the province of the jury was invaded. Therefore, because the "Briggs Instruction" was given and no supplemental death
penalty instructions were recited, the appellant's death sentence was
reversed and a new penalty trial was ordered.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT
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G. A defendant is not denied effective assistanceof counsel
where guilt is conceded and counsel emphasizes a
defendant's insanityplea. Where a defendant offers
evidence of good characterin mitigation of the charges
against him, a "no sympathy" instruction is improper:
People v. Wade.
In People v. Wade, 43 Cal. 3d 366, 729 P.2d 239, 233 Cal. Rptr. 48
(1987), the defendant challenged his first degree murder conviction,
the jury's special circumstance findings, and his death penalty sentence. The basis for the defendant's murder conviction was his brutal
beating of his ten-year-old stepdaughter, which led to her death. The
defendant had asserted the insanity defense at trial, claiming that he
suffered from multiple personalities, but it was rejected by the jury.
Before the supreme court were the defendant's contentions that he
was denied adequate assistance of counsel and thus unjustly convicted, that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony
of the defendant's prior bad acts, that the jury's two special circumstance findings were improper, and that the trial court's submission
of a "no sympathy" instruction to the jury constituted reversible error. The court agreed with the defendant as to the "no sympathy"
instruction, and accordingly, reversed his death penalty sentence.
Only one of the special circumstance findings, however, was overturned by the court.
The defendant's lack of effective assistance of counsel challenge
rested primarily upon defense counsel's courtroom approach of
openly admitting his client's guilt. The defendant's attorney concentrated on persuading the jury of the merit of his client's insanity defense. Referring to counsel's approach as realistic, the court found it
to be within his realm of tactical discretion in the presentation of his
client's case. The court further noted that counsel had thoroughly
presented all of the legal principles applicable to the defendant's
case. The court concluded that reversal, based on ineffective assistance of counsel, was not required. See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The court next discussed the merit of the defendant's contention
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts.
At trial, the defendant's ex-girlfriend was permitted to testify over
objection that the defendant had exhibited prior abusive conduct toward her children. The defense, relying on People v. Alcala, 36 Cal.
3d 604, 630-31, 685 P.2d 1126, 1140, 205 Cal. Rptr. 775, 789 (1984), as1037

serted that such evidence was inadmissible since it was offered to
prove the defendant's propensity to act consistently with his prior
misconduct.
The court rejected this contention. Of particular significance was
the fact that the witness' testimony contained no indication that one
of the defendant's alleged other personalities prompted his acts of
child abuse in the prior episodes. Therefore, the court held the girlfriend's testimony to be admissible since it was relevant to disprove
the defendant's insanity defense and was not offered to prove his propensity to repeat prior misconduct.
The defendant's girlfriend's testimony was also challenged as being
cumulative in nature and thus inadmissible. The defendant asserted
that the girlfriend merely repeated testimony, already received from
his wife and his two remaining stepchildren, that the defendant had
acted in a calculated, deliberate manner. The court refuted this argument by pointing out that the testimony of the wife and stepchildren
was littered with characterizations of the defendant as being irrational and volatile, rather than calculated and deliberate. The court
thus concluded this testimony was anything but cumulative.
The defendant's final attack on the admissibility of the testimony
as to his prior bad acts rested upon section 352 of the Evidence Code.
Section 352 calls for the exclusion of any evidence where the probative value of the evidence, in the discretion of the trial court, is outweighed by its potential prejudicial effect. The supreme court
affirmed the trial court's admission of this evidence in light of its
substantial relevance to disproving the defendant's insanity defense.
Next, the court analyzed the defendant's vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the statutes underlying the special circumstances findings. The court supported the defendant's attack on the
"heinous murder" finding, noting that the enactment, section
190.2(a)(14) of the Penal Code, had already been challenged and defeated in People v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 797, 647 P.2d 76, 183
Cal. Rptr. 800 (1982). That special circumstance finding was accordingly set aside.
Section 190.2(a)(18) of the Penal Code, the statutory foundation for
the defendant's "torture-murder" special circumstance finding, had
similarly been challenged in a prior case, but had received a saving
construction in People v. Davenport, 41 Cal. 3d 247, 270-71, 710 P.2d
861, 221 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1985). The Davenport court incorporated an
intent to torture requirement into the statute. The defendant urged
reversal based upon the trial court's failure to instruct the jury expressly that a finding of specific intent to torture was a necessary element of the special circumstance. The contention was dismissed
1038
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since the court found the jury to have been adequately instructed by
the court on the elements of the crime of torture-murder.
The defendant's final assignment of error involved the trial court's
penalty phase introduction of an instruction that the jury should not
permit itself to be influenced by pity for the defendant. The court,
following People v. Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 537-38, 709 P.2d 440, 453,
220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 650 (1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 2274 (1986), recognized that, where the defendant offered evidence of his good character in mitigation of the charges against him, to attempt to preclude
all use of sympathy by the jury created an ambiguous situation. On
this ground, the court reversed the jury's death penalty judgment.
In summary, the court affirmed the jury's finding of defendant's
guilt of first degree murder and the torture-murder special circumstance finding. However, the court reversed the finding of the heinous murder special circumstance, based upon constitutional
grounds. The imposition of the death penalty was reversed because
the defendant was entitled to have the jurors consider sympathy as a
mitigating factor. See generally CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION
OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PROCEDURE & PRACTICE

§ 55 (1986).
MITCHELL

H.

F.

DISNEY

When a criminal defendant has undergone trial based on
a submitted transcriptof the preliminary hearing, the
trial court's error in failing to advise the defendant of
waiver of his right against self-incriminationis
reversible only when the error is prejudicial: People v.
Wright.

In People v. Wright, 43 Cal. 3d 487, 729 P.2d 260, 233 Cal. Rptr. 69
(1987), the supreme court held that when trial courts fail to advise
criminal defendants of their waiver of the right against self-incrimination by admission of the transcript from the preliminary hearing,
those judgments are not reversible per se. They are reversible only if
a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reasonably
probable had he been properly advised.
The parties submitted the case to the court for trial based on the
transcript of the preliminary hearing, reserving the right to present
evidence. The defendant waived his right to a jury trial, as well as
his right to confront witnesses who had testified at the preliminary
1039

hearing. In the resultant trial, the defendant was convicted of firstdegree murder, burglary, and three counts of robbery.
Of primary import was the trial court's failure to warn the defendant that in submitting the transcript for trial he was waiving his right
against self-incrimination, a warning required by Bunnell v. Superior
Court, 13 Cal. 3d 592, 531 P.2d 1086, 119 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1975). In Bunnell, the supreme court established a requirement that in cases involving either a plea of guilty or submission of a transcript for trial,
the record must contain express waivers of the right to jury trial, the
right to confrontation of witnesses, and the right against selfincrimination.
An important question was the effect of a trial court's error in
omitting one or more of these mandatory recorded waivers. The
supreme court held earlier in People v. Levey, 8 Cal. 3d 648, 504 P.2d
452, 105 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1973), that, when the transcript submission
amounted to a "slow plea," i.e., tantamount to a plea of guilty, the
conviction of a defendant without waiver of the right against self-incrimination was per se reversible. Until the instant case, the court
had not, however, specifically addressed this situation where the
transcript submissions was not a slow plea. Conflicting decisions by
different districts of the court of appeal over the last decade
presented the need for a supreme court decision on this point.
One line of appellate decisions (beginning with People v. Ingram,
60 Cal. App. 3d 722, 131 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1976), and proceeding through
People v. Mora, 153 Cal. App. 3d 18, 199 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1984)) asserted the view that Bunnell error did not require reversal of the
conviction unless the defendant was prejudiced thereby. Another
line of cases (from People v. Kirkwood, 70 Cal. App. 3d 290, 138 Cal.
Rptr. 649 (1977), through People v. Drieslein, 170 Cal. App. 3d 591,
216 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1984)), espoused the perspective that any instance
of Bunnell error required reversal per se.
In People v. Wright, the supreme court gave its blessing to the former line of authority in requiring reversal per se only for slow pleas.
To gain reversal in cases where the transcript submission is not tantamount to a plea of guilty, the defendant must show that the error
was prejudicial. This view appears to be in harmony with article 6,
section 13 of the California Constitution, which forbids the setting
aside of judgments on the basis of procedural error except when the
error results in a "miscarriage of justice." CAL. CONST. art. 6 § 13.
"[A] 'miscarriage of justice,'" according to the court in People v.
Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d 243 (1956), "should be declared only
when the court ... is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error." Id. at 836, 299 P.2d at 254 (cita1040
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tions omitted). This "miscarriage of justice" standard was endorsed
by the supreme court as applicable to the present facts. Applying
this test, the court concluded that the error committed was not prejudicial and affirmed the conviction.
The court recognized in its opinion that this rule of law is not the
easier of the two perspectives to administer. Per se reversal for all
instances of Bunnell error would have been much simpler and more
clear cut. Wright now requires a twofold determination when the
necessary advisements and waivers do not appear in the record: first,
whether the transcript submission in a particular case constitutes a
slow plea; second, if so, whether the error of omitting waivers was
prejudicial to the defendant. The court acknowledged the potential
for an added burden on appellate courts in making these determinations and, therefore, advised trial courts in rather pointed terms that
the preferred course of action includes giving Bunnell warnings in all
submission cases.
Through People v. Wright, the supreme court thus resolved a decade of discord on a point of criminal law within the court of appeal.
In cases where trial by submitted transcript is not equivalent to a
slow plea of guilty, a trial court's error in failing to advise a defendant and obtain an explicit waiver of his right against self-incrimination on the record requires reversal only when it was reasonably
likely that the defendant would have experienced a more favorable
judgment had the requisite warnings been given.
BRUCE MONROE

I. Section 647(f) of the Penal Code, which makes public
drunkenness a criminal offense, is constitutional,even as
applied to chronic alcoholics: Sundance v. Municipal Court.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Sundance v. Municipal Court,' four public inebriates and one
taxpayer sought to have section 647(f) of the Penal Code 2 declared
1. 42 Cal. 3d 1101, 729 P.2d 80, 232 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1986). The opinion was written
by the court. Justice Grodin wrote a separate concurring opinion with Justice Lucas
concurring. Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which
Justice Reynoso concurred.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(f) (West Supp. 1987) (hereinafter section 647(f)]. Section 647(f) provides in pertinent part:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor [including any person] [w]ho is found in any public
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unconstitutional. The plaintiffs contended that the statute violated
the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment on its face, as well as when applied to chronic alcoholics.
Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that arrested alcoholics have a constitutional right to rehabilitative treatment. They further claimed
the methods used to enforce the statute violated the arrestees' due
process rights. Finally, the taxpayer plaintiff asserted that section
647(f) constituted a waste of public funds.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In reviewing the case, the trial court made numerous factual findings. In the year in which the complaint was filed, over thirty percent of all misdemeanor arrests were section 647(f) arrests. 3 Due to
the high volume of these arrests, the arresting officers used a "short
form arrest report." 4 These reports included a check list for objective symptoms and required a signature from only one of the arrest5
ing officers. The reports did not include the names of any witnesses.
The arrestees did not undergo any field sobriety checks nor were
they given chemical tests. Often placed in windowless, overcrowded
wagons with wooden benches, arrestees were sometimes injured during the unsupervised rides to the jail.6 Upon arrival, they were
placed in "drunk tanks" with no furnishings or bedding. Medical at7
tention was scarcely provided, even for the very sick.
The arrestees are then either referred to a civil detoxification
center (which accepted only twenty arrestees per day) or released in
accordance with section 849(b)(2) of the Penal Code.8 This section allows the police to release the arrestee if he was arrested without a
warrant. 9 Prior to Special Order 23,10 this procedure was used only
when the jail was full. All other arrestees had to go through criminal processing."1
place under the influence of intoxicating liquor... in such a condition that he
or she is unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or the safety of
others.
Id. See generally California Standardsfor the Search of Inebriates, 8 Sw. U.L. REV.
672 (1976).
3. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1109, 729 P.2d at 84, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
4. Id. See generally Goodman, Public Inebriate and the Police in California, 5
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 259 (1975).

5. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1110, 729 P.2d at 84, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1110-12, 729 P.2d at 84-85, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 818-19.
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 849(b)(2) (West 1985).
9. Id.
10. The Los Angeles Police Department set forth Special Order 23 which states
that 647(f) arrestees are to be released within four hours "unless there is a particular
reason for denying relief." Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1111, 729 P.2d at 85, 232 Cal. Rptr.
at 819.
11. Id.
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The remaining arrestees had to remain in custody unless they
posted $50 bail or qualified to be released on their own recognizance.
Most were indigent and/or homeless and could neither post bail nor
qualify for release on their own recognizance.1 2 At the arraignment,
usually without the assistance of counsel or an express waiver of
counsel, they were required to enter their plea. They were informed
that a guilty plea was considered a waiver of all their rights. Most
plead guilty to shorten their sentence for incarceration: 1.87 days versus 21-25 days if they plead not guilty. 13 The trial court further
found that alcoholism was an illness upon which the penal system
14
had no positive rehabilitative effect.
The trial court granted the following injunctive relief:
(1) There must be a medical screening so that the severely ill may
be transferred to a hospital.
(2) Arrestees must be given at least one meal while in custody.
(3) Padded benches or cots must be provided during the booking
process.
(4) Chemical tests must be provided for arrestees who request
them and for those against whom a complaint will be filed.
(5) Only ten arrestees may be transferred per wagon and the
wagons must be padded.15
The trial court also held that the arrest reports must contain witness's names and specific facts.16 Furthermore, the rights to counsel,
to a jury trial, and to confrontation must be expressly waived.17 Finally, the arrestees have the right to a probable cause hearing and to
a trial within five days of arraignment.1 8
The lower court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the statute violated the eighth amendment on its face, or as applied to alcoholics,
although it found that alcoholism could be used as an affirmative defense. 19 In addition, the trial court rejected the proposition that section 647(f) arrests constitute a waste of public funds.2O
12. Id. at 1111-12, 729 P.2d at 85, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
13. Id. at 1112-13, 729 P.2d at 86, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 820. A plea of not guilty results
in a trial, until which time individuals who do not qualify for release must remain incarcerated. Id.
14. Id. at 1114-15, 729 P.2d at 87, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
15. Id. at 1116, 729 P.2d at 88, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
16. Id. at 1117, 729 P.2d at 89, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1117-18, 729 P.2d at 89, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
20. Id. at 1118, 729 P.2d at 90, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 824.
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III.
A.

THE OPINION OF THE COURT

The Eighth Amendment

Plaintiffs claimed that section 647(f) of the Penal Code was facially
unconstitutional. In support of this claim the plaintiffs relied upon
the United States Supreme Court decision in Rhodes v. Chapman,21
which held that criminal statutes which lack a penalogical justification constitute cruel and unusual punishment because they inflict unnecessary pain. 22 However, the court rejected this argument, stating
that although the statute may have lacked justification as to chronic
alcoholics, the statute was not so "purposeless" in regard to the rest
23
of society as to constitute an eighth amendment violation.
The plaintiffs then asserted that the enforcement of the statute
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. First, they asserted that
the statute inflicted excessive punishment on chronic alcoholics since
they are incarcerated for unreasonable amounts of time as a result of
successive or aggregate sentences. 24 The plaintiffs relied upon the
holding in In re Foss.25 Foss was sentenced to ten years imprisonment for possession of heroin. Because he was on parole at the time
he committed the crime, the trial judge amplified his sentence. The
Foss court held that "increased punishment for a further offense"
was cruel and unusual punishment in light of his addiction. 26 However, Foss Was held inapplicable to the case at bar because it does not
involve increased punishment. The court reasoned that Foss did not
2
bar successive punishment, just increased punishment. 7
The plaintiffs also argued that the wagon transport system and the
detention facilities constituted cruel and unusual punishment. They
claimed the injunctive relief granted by the trial court was insufficient. 28 The supreme court rejected these claims, stating that
whether the relief granted was adequate was best left to the trier of
29
fact, and declined to consider the issue.
Further, the plaintiffs contended that incarceration amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment due to its dehabilitative effect. 30 The
plaintiffs cited Pugh v. Lock,31 which held that a penal system must
21. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
22. Id. at 346. See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
23. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1119, 729 P.2d at 91, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 824. See generally 19 CAL. JUR. 3D (Rev.) CriminalLaw § 1963 (1984).
24. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1119-20, 729 P.2d at 91, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 824. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 626 (1981 & Supp. 1986).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
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10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974).
Id. at 923, 519 P.2d at 1085, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1121, 729 P.2d at 91-92, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 825-26.
Id. at 1123-24, 729 P.2d at 93-94, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
Id.
Id. at 1125, 729 P.2d at 94, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
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*..."32
not impede "an inmate's ability to attempt rehabilitation .
Although the present court accepted the lower court's finding that
incarceration without treatment may be dehabilitating, the court
held that Pugh was inapplicable to the facts of this case since it did
3
not apply to incarcerations of short duration.3
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that incarcerating people "for the
'status' of having a mental or physical illness or disorder constitute[d]

a violation of the cruel and unusual punishment clause ...

unless it

[was] accompanied by adequate treatment." 34 This argument was rejected because the inebriates were not arrested due to their "status"
as alcoholics. Rather, they were arrested because they were intoxicated. Therefore, the inebriates were not constitutionally entitled to
35
treatment.
B.

Due Process

The plaintiffs contended that various enforcement practices of section 647(f) violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. First, they claimed that because the arrestees' rights were
read to them en masse, not individually, and their rights were not expressly waived, the arrestees' due process rights were violated.36 Furthermore, the plaintiffs asserted that the arrestees were entitled to
have the specific elements of the charged offense explained to them,
and that the arrestees were entitled to a probable cause hearing.3 7
On these issues the trial court agreed, finding that rights may not
be read to arrestees en masse and that waiver of rights must be individually and expressly waived. 38 The trial court also concluded that
the specific elements of the offense must be explained to the arrestees and that they must be informed of their right to a probable
cause hearing.3 9 These findings were not contested upon appeal.
32. Id at 330.
33. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1126, 729 P.2d at 95, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
34. Id. (quoting People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 359, 535 P.2d 373, 386, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 522 (1975)). See also Light, Decriminalizationof Public Drunkeness, 135
NEW L.J. 66 (1985); Stevens, Decriminalizationand Beyond: Public Inebriety in Los
Angeles County, 3 WHirrIER L. REV. 55 (1981); Comment, Taking the Public Inebriate
Out of California's CriminalJustice System: Problems in Law and Medicine, 7 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 539 (1974).
35. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1127, 729 P.2d at 95, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
36. Id. at 1128, 729 P.2d at 96, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
37. Id. at 1128, 729 P.2d at 96-97, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 830-31.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Thus, the trial court's ruling on these issues remained unchanged.40
The plaintiffs also argued that arrestees were effectively denied
their right to trial because of the inadequate arrest reports and the
extended delay for a trial hearing (21-25 days).41 The court affirmed
the trial court's relief, requiring that the arrest reports contain witnesses' names and specific facts. 42 In addition, the court agreed that
arrestees pleading not guilty must be afforded a trial hearing within
43
five days of arraignment.
Finally, plaintiffs argued that Special Order 23 was unconstitutionally vague such that it denied arrestees due process of law. 44 Special
Order 23 provided in pertinent part that every section 647(f) arrestee
is to be released after four hours unless "[t]here are other specific ar45
ticulated facts justifying continued detention and/or prosecution."
However, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument on the grounds
that Special Order 23 was not a criminal statute regulating public
conduct.46 Rather, it was a guide to the police department in decid47
ing whether or not to prosecute.
C. Waste of Public Funds
The taxpayer plaintiff asserted that section 647(f) constituted a
waste of public funds. He argued that the civil detoxification centers
48
were much more effective and less expensive than prosecution.
However, in order for public spending to constitute waste it must be
found that "no public benefit can, within the limits of reasonable legislative judgment, be found for the expenditure." 49 Waste does not
necessarily include errors in official judgment or discretion. The
court reasoned that, since the enforcement of section 647(f) provided
some public benefit in keeping inebriates off of the streets, it did not
50
amount to waste.
IV.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Grodin concurred with the majority. However, he dis40. Id. at 1129, 729 P.2d at 97, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 831.

41. Idc.
42. Id. at 1130, 729 P.2d at 98, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1133, 729 P.2d at 100, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
45. Id. at 1133, 729 P.2d at 99, 232 Cal. Rptr., at 833.
46. Id. at 1133, 729 P.2d at 100, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 834. See generally Grayned v. City

of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (Court describes the inherent problems with vague
criminal statutes).
47. Sundance, 42 Cal. 3d at 1134, 729 P.2d at 100, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 834.
48. Id. at 1137, 729 P.2d at 102, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
49. Id. at 1137, 729 P.2d at 103, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 837.

50. Id. at 1138-39, 729 P.2d at 103-04, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 837-38.
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agreed with its characterization of the issue. 51 Although he believed
section 647(f) to be constitutional, he recognized the ineffectiveness
52
of the statute in dealing with the underlying problem of alcoholism.
Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion stressing the "inherent limitations of such a solution."5 3 She believed that the court did not remedy all the constitutional violations.
She stated that because there was usually "no formal arraignment,
the entire process [was] insulated from judicial review," and thus the
remedies provided did not aid detainees. 54 Furthermore, she believed
that, because the arrestees are not normally indicted, the arrests
"serve no other purpose than protective custody." 55 Thus, the Chief
Justice reasoned that, because most of the arrestees are detained for
their own protection, they are constitutionally entitled to
56
treatment.
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the court recognized the limitations of the "drunk in
public" statute in solving our society's problem of alcoholism, it realized the statute was not unconstitutional. Section 647(f) is not aimed
at giving aid to those with drinking problems. Rather it is a way to
keep the drunks off of the public thoroughfares. Admittedly, a civil
alternative, such as the civil detoxification facilities, would be more
effective than criminal prosecution in solving the underlying problem. The reality of the situation is that there is just not enough room
in the current detoxification facilities to help all of the alcoholics
who need help. The decision to change the law by referring inebriates to detoxification facilities should be left to the legislature. It is
probable that these centers would be of far greater help to society
than the enforcement of section 647(f). However, the fact is that sec51. Id. at 1139, 729 P.2d at 104, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (Grodin, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 1139-40, 729 P.2d at 104, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 838 (Grodin, J., concurring).
53. Id at 1140, 729 P.2d at 105, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 839 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
54. Id. at 1147, 729 P.2d at 109, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 843 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
55. Id at 1151, 729 P.2d at 112, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 846 (Bird, C.J., concurring and
dissenting).
56. Id. at 1153-55, 729 P.2d at 113-14, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (Bird, C.J., concurring
and dissenting).
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tion 647(f) has been declared constitutional and until the legislature
repeals the statute, it should be enforced.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

III.

CORPORATE LAW
In a merger situation where a shareholderwas aware of
all facts which constituted the basis of his claim of
corporatefiduciary misconduct, an appraisalproceeding
was the shareholder'sexclusive remedy: Steinberg v.
Amplica, Inc.
I. INTRODUCTION

In Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc.,' the court addressed the issue of
whether the statutory appraisal right set forth in the Corporations
Code2 is the exclusive remedy for a minority shareholder who claims
that his shares are undervalued as a result of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by the corporation's officers, directors, and majority
shareholders.3 The court held in the affirmative, limiting its decision
to circumstances where the complaining stockholder is aware of the
misconduct of majority shareholders and management prior to the
consummation of the merger, but nevertheless chooses to sue for
damages after the fact rather than assert his appraisal rights. In
reaching this conclusion, the court found that where a minority
shareholder claims damages for the decreased value of his stock re1. 42 Cal. 3d 1198,.729 P.2d 683, 233 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1986). Justice Mosk wrote the
majority opinion, with Justices Broussard, Lucas, and Panelli concurring. Chief Justice Bird wrote in dissent and was joined by Justices Reynoso and Grodin.
2. The Corporations Code provides:
(a) No shareholder of a corporation who has a right under this chapter to demand payment of cash for the shares held by the shareholder shall have any
right at law or in equity to attack the validity of the reorganization or shortform merger, or to have the reorganization or short-form merger set aside or
rescinded, except in an action to test whether the number of shares required
to authorize or approve the reorganization have been legally voted in favor
thereof; but any holder of shares of a class whose terms and provisions specifically set forth the amount to be paid in respect to them in the event of a reorganization or short-form merger is entitled to payment in accordance with
those terms and provisions.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(a) (West 1977). The opinion addressed appraisal as an "exclusive remedy" in mergers wherein one merging corporation does not control the other,
and where the two corporations are not under common control. The burden of proof
in such cases is addressed by section 1312(c) of the Corporations Code. The court
found these subdivisions inapplicable to this case. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1214, 729
P.2d at 694, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 259. For cases which deal with similar provisions, see
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del Super. Ct. 1985) (parentsubsidiary cash-out merger); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. Super. Ct.
1983) (parent-subsidiary cash-out merger).
3. The court of appeal addressed the same question in Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd.
v. Merchants Petroleum Co., 147 Cal. App. 3d 134, 195 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1983).
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sulting from an improper merger, the claim constitutes an attack on
the validity of the merger within the meaning of the appraisal
4
statute.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 22, 1981, Steinberg, the plaintiff, purchased a small
number of shares of the defendant corporation, Amplica, Inc. [hereinafter Amplica] in its first public offering of shares. Both before and
after the offering, the majority of Amplica's stock was controlled by
several of the defendant's officers and directors. On October 9, 1981,
Amplica announced plans to merge with co-defendant Communications Satellite Corp. [hereinafter Comsat], whereby Amplica would
become a wholly owned subsidiary of Comsat. Amplica notified its
stockholders that the merger would be put to a vote on December 7,
1981, and sent out a proxy statement detailing the proposal. The
merger proposal passed by a ninety percent vote. Steinberg did not
oppose the merger; instead, he exchanged his shares at the offered
price, making a small profit.

5

Following the merger, the plaintiff filed this action, 6 alleging fraud
and breach of fiduciary duty by the majority shareholders and man7
agement in carrying out an illegal "freeze-out" merger. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that the prospectus for Amplica's public
offering contained omissions and misrepresentations since it failed to
disclose Amplica's plans for a merger, and stated that proceeds from

the issuance would be used for business operations, while in reality
4. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(a) (West 1977).

5. In general, one must oppose the merger and make a written demand for payment on dissenting shares in order to assert appraisal rights. See generally 15 CAL.
JUR. 3D Corporations§§ 430-438 (1983); Buxbaum, The Dissenter's Appraisal Remedy,
23 UCLA L. REV. 1229 (1976); Barton, Business Combinations and the New General
CorporationLaw, 9 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 738, 784-99 (1976). Although the court did not
discuss whether the plaintiff had appraisal rights after failing to demand payment,
such conduct would constitute waiver of appraisal rights. See Joseph v. Wallace-Murray Corp., 354 Mass. 477, 238 N.E.2d 360 (1968) (mere demand for payment at merger
price effected waiver of appraisal rights).
6. The plaintiff filed the case for the class of stockholders who had purchased
Amplica stock within 90 days of the first public offering and who still held stock at the
time of the merger. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1203, 729 P.2d at 686, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 25152.
7. A "freeze-out" merger is accomplished where majority shareholders force the
minority shareholders to liquidate or sell their shares not incident to a valid business
purpose. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1204 n.6, 729 P.2d at 686 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 251 n.6.
See Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1192-93 (1964).
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they were used to make the company's finances more attractive for
merger. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that officers and directors
received personal financial benefit from the merger to the detriment
of minority shareholders. The plaintiff prayed for compensatory and
exemplary damages.
The defendants claimed, among other things, that under section
1312(a) of the Corporations Code [hereinafter section 1312(a)], appraisal was the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. The trial court relied on
the decision in Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum
Co.,8 wherein the court of appeal held for the defendant corporation
in a similar factual situation and granted the defendant's summary
judgment motion. The court of appeal affirmed.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Plaintiff'sclaims constituted an attack on the validity of the

merger.
The majority first addressed whether the plaintiff's claims came
within the purview of section 1312(a)'s restriction of remedies. Because the plaintiff made no request to set aside or rescind the
merger, the initial question for the court was whether the plaintiff's
action amounted to an attack on the merger's validity.9
The court noted that disagreement exists as to the scope of "an attack on validity" of a merger.10 However, the court reasoned that
since the plaintiff's claim was for damages resulting from the fact
that he no longer had an interest in the merged corporation, it was
an attack on the validity of the merger." Thus, the court concluded
that the plaintiff's claim was within the scope of section 1312(a)'s
12
restrictions.
B.

Plaintiffwas limited to the appraisalremedy.

The court next examined whether a plaintiff who alleged fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and illegality could sue for compensatory
and exemplary damages where the plaintiff was aware of the claimed
misconduct prior to the meeting at which the merger was approved.
The first question the court faced was whether the plaintiff in fact
did have such knowledge.
8. 147 Cal. App. 3d 134, 195 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1983). In Sturgeon, the plaintiff
claimed the offering price was insufficient and unfair. However, because the plaintiff
failed to show an adequate basis for his claim of fraud, he was limited to the appraisal
remedy.
9. Steinberg,42 Cal. 3d at 1205, 729 P.2d at 687, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
10. Id. Cf H. BALLANTINE & G. STERLING, 1A CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS LAWS
§ 262.05(f) (4th ed. 1986).
11. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1205-06, 729 P.2d at 688, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
12. Id. at 1207, 729 P.2d at 689, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
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A key factor that the court considered was the plaintiff's receipt,
prior to the meeting, of a proxy statement containing the facts upon
which his claim was based. 13 The court further noted that the plaintiff had "acknowledged in a deposition that he discussed his right to
appraisal with his attorney before the merger but decided not to seek
that remedy."14 These factors were deemed evidence of the plaintiff's awareness of the facts upon which his claim was based prior to
the stockholder vote on the merger.' 5
In addressing the role that fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
played in determining whether appraisal was the plaintiff's exclusive
remedy, the court balanced the competing public policy considerations underlying the appraisal remedy.16 One consideration was the
danger of discouraging beneficial mergers due to shareholder suits
demanding unwarranted high payoffs for shares and punitive damages. 17 On the other side was the need to ensure that those in control of corporations remain bound to their fiduciary duty to minority
stockholders.18 Into this equation the court injected the plaintiff's
prior knowledge of the facts which operated to diminish the weight
of the fiduciary duty factor.19 Thus, the court concluded that the
plaintiff could not maintain an action for damages based on fraud or
20
breach of fiduciary duty.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. The balancing approach taken by the court differs from the approach generally taken by courts in other jurisdictions which have also addressed the effect of fraud
on the exclusivity of the appraisal remedy. See, e.g., Twenty-Seven Trust v. Realty
Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982) (appraisal petition did not bar damages where serious allegations of breach of fiduciary duty found); Miller v. Steinbach,
268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Pennsylvania exclusivity of appraisal law related
only to mergers not tainted by fraud); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club,
Inc., 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986) (dissenting stockholder not limited to statutory remedy of judicial appraisal where violations of fiduciary duty found).
17. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1210, 729 P.2d at 691, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
18. Id The fiduciary duty owed by majority stockholders to the minority is well
established. See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969) (controlling shareholders may not use their power to control corporation to benefit themselves to the exclusion and detriment of minority). See also Eagle
v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1465
(1985) (majority shareholders have fiduciary duty not to use ability to control to benefit of majority and detriment of minority); Smith v. Tele-Communication, Inc., 134 Cal.
App. 3d 338, 184 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1982) (breach of fiduciary duty by majority present
where tax savings to parent caused reduced distributions to minority stockholders of
subsidiary).
19. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1211, 729 P.2d at 691, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 257.
20. Id. at 1212, 729 P.2d at 692, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 257. This conclusion is consistent
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C. The Appraisal Statute provided the plaintiffwith an adequate
remedy.
Last, the court addressed the adequacy of the appraisal remedy for
a plaintiff who claims undervaluation of shares due to breach of fiduciary duty by management. The court found the appraisal remedy to
be adequate under the circumstances, noting that the plaintiff could
have availed himself of an extensive statutory scheme through which
to prove undervaluation,21 and that he would not have lost any of his
rights through appraisal.2 2 In addition, the court commented that
any adequacy problems would be more appropriately addressed by
23
the legislature than by the courts.
IV.

DISSENTING OPINION

The dissenting opinion stated that it was permissible to allow the
plaintiff to recover in his action for damages, and criticized the majority for striking "a forceful blow against [California's] strong public
policy of protecting the investing public from frauds and deceptions
committed in securities transactions." 24 The dissenters urged that
the appraisal remedy was inadequate for parties damaged in a corporate reorganization. 25
The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's finding that
the plaintiff's damage claims rendered the action an attack on the validity of the merger.2 6 Instead, the dissent focused on the plaintiff's
claims of fraud as the determinative factor as to whether to apply the
statute. 27 Because the plaintiff was defrauded from the beginning of
the public offering, the action was not an attack on the merger and,
2
therefore, the statute did not relegate the plaintiff to appraisal. 8
The dissent emphasized that the failure to disclose the proposed
merger in the prospectus formed the basis for the plaintiff's allegations, and this omission was not cured by the proxy statement. 2 9 Because the plaintiff demonstrated a sufficient possibility of fraud, he
with the requirement that a plaintiff allege reliance in order to state a claim of fraud.
See Flum Partners v. Child World, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Twenty
Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982).
21. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1300-1304 (West 1977 & Supp. 1987).
22. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1209, 729 P.2d at 687, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 255.
23. Id. at 1209-10, 729 P.2d at 691, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
24. Id. at 1214, 729 P.2d at 694, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 259 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
25. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 1215-16, 729 P.2d at 695, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1215, 729 P.2d at 695, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
28. Id at 1216, 729 P.2d at 695, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1216 n.2, 729 P.2d at 695 n.2, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 260 n.2 (Bird C.J., dissenting). See also Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona v. Trustee for Westgate-California Corp.,
609 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1979) (adequacy of disclosure examined in statement which announced merger); Flum Partners v. Child World, Inc., 557 F. Supp. 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(allegations of fraud focused on proxy statement).
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should not have been limited to appraisal as his sole remedy. 30 The
dissent suggested that in fact, the prevailing view among courts
which have decided similar cases is that wrongful conduct by corporate fiduciaries creates an exception to the limitation.3 1 Criticizing
the majority for placing undue weight on threats to the controlling
shareholders' power, the dissent concluded that the plaintiff's claim
fit this exception and thus, the plaintiff was not restricted to the ap32
praisal remedy.
Finally, the dissent asserted that appraisal is inadequate redress for
an injured shareholder. 33 The statute's technicalities were seen as
difficult to utilize and a disincentive to pursuing appraisal.3 4 In addition, the dissenters urged that the appraisal procedure provides early
warning to management regarding the impending dissent and forces
shareholders into appraisal before having the opportunity to assess
its wisdom.3 5 Thus, the dissent argued that the statute neither allowed full compensation for damages nor facilitated its purpose of
preventing fiduciary misconduct. 36 In so concluding, the dissent
found that the majority's holding effectively condones fraudulent
37
conduct by corporate fiduciaries.
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority of the court held that a minority shareholder who
claims damages resulting from the consummation of a merger attacks
the validity of the merger itself within the meaning of section 1312(a)
and is thus subject to its restrictions. In its analysis, the majority bal30. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1217, 729 P.2d at 696, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). See Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028,
1038 (D. Md. 1982); Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 397 Mass. 525,
492 N.E.2d 1112 (1986).
31. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1217-18, 729 P.2d at 696, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (Bird,
C.J., dissenting). See Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1036.
32. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1218-20, 729 P.2d at 697-98, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 262-63
(Bird, C.J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1219, 729 P.2d at 697, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). See
also Buxbaum, The Dissenter'sAppraisal Remedy, 23 UCLA L. REV. 1229 (1976); Brudney & Chirelstein, FairShares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REV.
297 (1974).
34. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1219, 729 P.2d at 697, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 262 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting). For the complete process see CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1300-1312 (West 1977 &
Supp. 1987).
35. Steinberg, 42 Cal. 3d at 1220, 729 P.2d at 698, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
36. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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anced the harm such lawsuits visit upon corporate progress against
the need to prevent corporate fiduciary misconduct. By finding that
the plaintiff had knowledge of the claimed illegalities prior to the
stockholder meeting at which the merger was approved, the court
felt compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy lay in
appraisal. The majority's balancing of policies was a departure from
the prevailing approach used by other state and federal courts which
view fraud cases as an exception to the rule of the exclusivity of the
appraisal remedy. While the result in Steinberg would likely have
been the same under either view but for the factual question of plaintiff's prior knowledge, the court affirmed the necessity of utilizing
available statutory remedies.
SARAH A. FUHRMAN
IV.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A.

The substantial evidence rule was the properstandard
for a trial court's review of a Board of Prison Terms'
decision to revoke or rescind a previously granted parole:
In re Powell.

In In re Powell, 42 Cal. 3d 1075, 728 P.2d 1188, 232 Cal. Rptr. 553
(1986), the supreme court rendered its second in a series of decisions
concerning Gregory Ulas Powell. The instant case held that where a
Board of Prison Terms' [hereinafter BPT] decision revoking or rescinding parole was reviewed, the court must determine whether the
decision was supported by substantial evidence. In applying this standard, the court found that evidence of the prisoner's sexual misconduct which was previously rejected as unfounded could not be used to
support a decision to rescind. Additionally, the court acknowledged
that error was created because valid evidence regarding one of several escape attempts should have been, but was not, considered in the
rescission hearing. However, because this error was not fundamental, it did not justify rescission of parole.
Powell, a career criminal, was convicted of first degree murder and
sentenced to death for the 1963 murder of a Los Angeles police officer. Powell and a companion, Jimmy Lee Smith, were stopped by
two police officers for a minor traffic violation. Powell shot one of
the officers, and the second officer made a miraculous escape. The
story of this crime and the ensuing trial was the subject of a book entitled "The Onion Field" by Joseph Wambaugh and, later, a movie by
the same name.
Powell's conviction was reversed, but he was again convicted, and
his sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. People v. Powell, 67
Cal. 2d 32, 429 P.2d 137, 59 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1967); People v. Powell, 40
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Cal. App. 3d 107, 115 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1974). Prior to modification of
his sentence, Powell made several escape attempts. However, after
the modification, he had a record as an exemplary prisoner. Following a parole consideration hearing in 1977 and later progress reports,
Powell was granted a parole release date of June 13, 1982. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1168, 3040 (West 1982); 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 167, 172-75 (1979); B. WITKIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMES, §§ 1091, 1097 (1963).
In 1979, allegations of Powell's sexual misconduct arose, and they
were investigated by the BPT. Finding an insufficient factual basis
for the claims, the BPT dismissed the matters and rejected them
from consideration of Powell's progress. See generally 22 CAL. JUR.
3D Criminal Law § 3472 (1979). Psychiatric evaluations of Powell
made in the regular course of examining his case for parole concluded in favor of parole and its success.
However, in February 1982, two weeks after the release of the
movie, "The Onion Field," on national television, the BPT felt the
force of public pressure. In response to communications from the
governor, the district attorney, and the Board of Supervisors of Los
Angeles, the BPT scheduled a rescission hearing at which the psychiatric evaluations, previous escape attempts, and the allegations of
sexual misconduct were examined. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3041.5 (West 1982); 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions § 193 (1979).
The BPT's resulting rescission order had two bases. First, a psychiatric report presented at the hearing stated that Powell's proclivity
for violence remained, thus making his success as a parolee doubtful,
in spite of previous opinions. This report was based in significant
part on the assumption that the allegations of sexual misconduct
were true. Thus, the BPT found the need for public protection
weighed heavily in favor of continued psychiatric testing prior to parole. In addition, the BPT concluded that the previous BPT panel
that had granted parole committed fundamental error when it failed
to consider one of Powell's several escape attempts in its determination to grant parole.
When the Superior Court of Solano County reviewed this decision,
the judge applied the independent judgment standard of review. In
doing so, the court opposed both reasons for rescission set forth by
the BPT and granted Powell's writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, the
writ was denied by the court of appeal.
In its review, the supreme court examined the scope of the BPT's
1055

power to grant and remove parole. While the power to grant parole
is broad, the power to rescind is more limited. Rescission requires
good cause. See In re McLain, 55 Cal. 2d 78, 87, 357 P.2d 1080, 1086, 9
Cal. Rptr. 824, 830 (1960). In addition, a parolee is entitled to due
process. See In re Prewitt,8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr.
318 (1972). See generally B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMES, §§ 96A-B,
1100, 1100A-B (1963 & Supp. 1985); Comment, Due Process in Parole
Revocation Proceedings63 CALIF. L. REV. 276 (1975).
The court acknowledged that section 1094.5 of the Civil Procedure
Code was to be used to determine whether administrative proceedings involving the deprivation of rights should be reviewed under the
independent judgment or substantial evidence test. However, the
former was applicable only where property and economic rights are
involved. The court reasoned that when rights to liberty were involved, as in the instant case, substantial evidence was the proper
test. Thus, the court determined that the trial judge applied the incorrect standard in examining the BPT's decision.
In applying the substantial evidence test, the court still found the
record did not warrant rescission. The BPT's reliance on the psychiatrists' recommendation was invalid. The report was based in part on
the assumption that the allegations of sexual misconduct were true,
while the BPT itself had dismissed those claims. The court would
not allow the BPT to base any part of its decision on information
which it had earlier rejected. Use of such information as a factual basis for a finding would violate the In re Prewitt due process
requirements.
The court stated that the prior BPT panel's failure to discover that
Powell had made an escape attempt in addition to those of which
they were aware was not fundamental error. See CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 15, § 2451 (1985) [hereinafter section 2451]. Although the exclusion was error, the court determined that knowledge of the additional evidence would not have created substantial difference in the
decision to grant parole.
The court pointed out in its conclusion that the holding eliminated
the need to address whether public outcry played a part in the BPT's
decision. The court's opinion as to what influence public pressure
should or should not have on parole decisions was left unexplained.
Nevertheless, the permissible reasons for rescission outlined in section 2451 do not include a category which would encompass public
opinion.
Yet, it is likely that public outrage at Powell's release was a major
impetus for the BPT calling a rescission hearing and may have
colored the opinions of BPT panel members. If such were the case,
then the BPT found weak evidentiary support to justify its decision.
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The court's rejection of the BPT's proffered reasons demonstrated
that even where public opinion was strong, it remained committed to
the integrity of individual constitutional rights and would require a
strong showing to support their denial.
SARAH A. FUHRMAN

B.

When executing a search warrant,the police must obtain
priorjudicial authorizationto use a motorized battering
ram and exigent circumstances must exist at the time of
execution: Langford v. Superior Court.

In Langford v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 21, 729 P.2d 822, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 387 (1987), the court considered the issue of whether the police
could employ the use of pyrotechnic devices and motorized battering
rams when executing a search warrant without prior judicial authorization. Additionally, the court considered whether a preliminary injunction was an appropriate remedy for the use of such devices.
The Los Angeles Police Department employed the use of the V-100
(a motorized battering ram) and flashbangs (pyrotechnic explosive
devices that created flashes of light and sounds resembling gunshots)
when executing a search warrant on a "rock house" (a specially fortified home where crystallized "rock" cocaine is manufactured and
sold). The owners of the dwelling brought an action for damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief, including an application for a preliminary injunction against use of the ram and the flashbangs. The
trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief and the
court of appeal summarily denied the petition.
The California Supreme Court held that use of the pyrotechnic device was not unreasonable and, therefore, the plaintiffs were properly denied preliminary injunctive relief. As to the battering ram,
the court held that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief. The court applied the
following test: 1) What is the likelihood that the plaintiff would prevail on the merits; and 2) whether the interim harm suffered by the
plaintiff would be greater than that suffered by the defendant.
As to the first prong of the test, the court based its holding on the
fourth amendment. The court held that the use of the battering ram
could be justified only where the police had obtained a valid search
warrant and prior judicial consent, and where exigent circumstances
existed at the time of the execution of the warrant. The court found
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that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits of the fourth
amendment challenge.
The court then considered the second part of the test, weighing the
possible harm the plaintiff might suffer by denial of injunctive relief
against the harm suffered by the defendant if such relief were
granted. The court found that the plaintiff would be exposed to
greater harm if the police were allowed to continue the per se unreasonable use of the battering ram without a detached neutral magistrate's authorization. The court believed that requiring an
authorization to use the ram would impose only a minimal burden on
the police since they may obtain the authorization at the same time
that they apply for the warrant.
JAMES A. COULTER,

III

C. For capital sentencing procedure, only one special
circumstanceper category can be imposed. A capital
defendant who does not receive benefits of disparate
sentence review is not denied equal protection: People v.
Allen.
I.

INTRODUCTION

People v. Allen1 presented a narrative of the murderous activities
of the head of a "crime family." 2 It was one of the few recent cases
wherein the supreme court upheld a death penalty sentence. In so
doing, the court necessarily decided a wide variety of issues presented
on appeal, most of which did not involve a particularly unique interpretation of the law.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant "employed" a variety of associates, including his
sons and girlfriend, to assist him in the commission of a myriad of
crimes. He silenced his criminal partners with numerous boasts and
threats, intimating that he could kill anyone any time, even from
3
prison.
The defendant made good on his threat in 1974. A young girl who
had acted as defendant's accomplice in the burglary of a neighborhood market confessed to one of the victims, implicating the defendant.4 Accordingly, the defendant ordered several of the "family"
members to kill the "snitch" and to dump the body into a canal. 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Id. at 1236, 729 P.2d at 120, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
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Thereafter, the defendant was even more vocal about his ability to
mortally injure any family member who snitched.
In 1977, the defendant was arrested and subsequently convicted for
armed robbery, attempted robbery, and assault with a deadly weapon.
This led to a trial for the 1974 market burglary and murder, at which
numerous family members and the burglary victim testified against
the defendant. He was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to prison.
From Folsom prison, the defendant met a convicted robber, Hamilton, who was scheduled to be paroled in 1980. Allen arranged for
Hamilton to contact his son, Kenneth, upon release. The defendant's
son provided the weapons which Hamilton then used to kill three
people, including the original victim/witness that had testified
against Allen.
Kenneth Allen was arrested on drug charges shortly after the
murders. He agreed to testify truthfully about the murders in exchange for protective custody and his choice of prisons.6 This plea
agreement was terminated when Kenneth changed his story in an effort to exculpate his father, even though he later confirmed his original story as the truth.
The defendant was convicted in superior court of three counts of
murder and conspiracy to murder seven witnesses that had testified
against him at his 1977 trial. Additionally, eleven special circumstances were found. The jury in the penalty phase deliberated for
just one day before deciding upon a death sentence. 7
III.

THE LEAD OPINION

Justice Grodin8 began the court's analysis by determining that the
prosecution's plea agreement with Kenneth Allen did not place him
6. Id. at 1243, 729 P.2d at 125, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
7. Id. at 1247, 729 P.2d at 128, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
8. The seven justices that participated in the decision affirmed the guilty verdict
of the lower court. Four justices agreed that the death penalty was appropriate. Justice Mosk concurred in the lead decision authored by Justice Grodin. Justice Panelli
concurring, wrote a short paragraph indicating disagreement in areas that did not affect the majority's ultimate conclusions regarding penalty phase error; Justice Lucas
concurred in this opinion. Justice Broussard wrote a separate opinion concurring with
the majority as to the judgment in the guilt phase and dissenting with respect to the
penalty phase; Justices Bird and Reynoso concurred in this opinion. Justice Bird also
wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion to "express [her] views on the proportionality review issue discussed in the majority opinion." Id. at 1290, 729 P.2d at
158, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
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"under such a strong compulsion to testify in a particular fashion as
to deny defendant a fair trial." 9 The prosecution had disavowed the
agreement when Kenneth committed perjury, and made sure that
Kenneth knew that the agreement would not be resurrected if he
changed his story to conform to his original version of events.
The court then denied the defendant's three charges of abuse of judicial discretion,O and held that any errors that might have arisen
under the circumstances were harmless. The majority of the court
supported the lower court's rulings on nearly every issue raised on
appeal, including lack of evidence to support an allegation of juror
12
misconduct" and several rulings concerning relevancy.
In analyzing the special circumstances alleged in support of the
death penalty, the court found three special circumstances rather
than eleven. 13 In applying the statutory provisions, the court declared that only one special circumstance could be found under any
14
category, even if numerous violations had occurred.
Finally, the jury instructions concerning weighing aggravating and
mitigating factors were challenged as misleading.15 The court agreed
that, considering the prosecutor's entire closing argument, the jury
9. Id at 1255, 739 P.2d at 133, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
10. The errors involved: 1) admission of nine color photographs of the murder victims taken at the crime scene or at the coroner's office before autopsies were performed; 2) the superior court made one ruling rather than two on defendant's motion
for new trial and statutory application for a new trial under section 190.4 of the Penal
Code; 3) placing and removing ankle restraints on a defense witness out of the presence of the jury. Id. at 1255-65, 729 P.2d at 133-40, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 867-74.
11. Id, at 1265, 729 P.2d at 141, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 874-75. When the judge informed
the jurors that they would be sequestered for the evening, he was asked if it was alright for the jurors to have a "small glass of wine or a small beer or something like
that." Id. He replied, "Let your conscience be your guide." Id. The defense unsuccessfully challenged this as juror misconduct since no evidence was ever offered to
show that any of the jurors consumed alcohol during the trial.
12. Id. at 1267-70, 729 P.2d at 142-44, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 876-78. Most of the questions
concerning relevancy arose as a result of the trial court's restriction of the defendant's
cross-examination of a prosecution witness. Like the defendant, the witness was serving time in Folsom prison. The witness' prior murder conviction itself was relevant for
impeachment purposes. However, the specific circumstances of the crime were not.
13. All seven justices concurred in this result. In so-called "special circumstances"
the judge at the penalty phase is bound by statute to impose a stiffer sentence (i.e.,
additional time in prison; death sentence rather than life in prison). Various special
circumstances are specifically defined in the Penal Code. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2 (West Supp. 1987).
14. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1273-74, 729 P.2d at 146-47, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 880-81. The
jury found the special circumstances to be true under three subdivisions of section
190.2 of the Penal Code: 1) multiple murders; 2) witness killing; and 3) prior murder
conviction. Id. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(2), (3), (10) (West 1985).
15. The prosecutor said in his closing statement to the jury: "If you conclude that
aggravating evidence outweighs the mitigating evidence, you shall return a verdict of
death." Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1288-89, 729 P.2d at 157, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis added). This was challenged as "mislead[ing]
the jury as to the ultimate question it was called on to answer in determining which
sentence to impose." Id. at 1277, 729 P.2d at 149, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
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was not mislead as to its discretion to decide if the death penalty was
appropriate under the circumstances.
IV.
A.

16

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINIONS

Justice Panelli
Justice Panelli wrote a single concurring paragraph to emphasize

his agreement with the majority regarding the harmless effect of errors committed during the penalty phase of the trial, and his disa-

greement with the majority regarding the "standard of review of
17
penalty phase error."'
B.

Justice Broussard
Justice Broussard strongly disagreed with the majority with re-

spect to the prejudicial effect of the prosecution's comments during
closing argument regarding jury instructions.' 8 He concluded that
the prosecution had told the jury that the death penalty was
mandatory if they found that aggravating evidence outweighed mitigating evidence.
C.

19

Chief Justice Bird
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Bird made a

forceful argument that the court should require proportionality re2
view of capital cases on state constitutional grounds. 0 The corner-

stone of the Chief Justice's argument rested on equal protection
16. 1I at 1280, 729 P.2d at 151, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 885. But see infra note 18 and
accompanying text.
17. Id. at 1288, 729 P.2d at 157, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (Panelli, J., concurring).
18. Just as the majority had, Justice Broussard relied on the analysis in People v.
Brown, 40 Cal. 3d 512, 709 P.2d 440, 220 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1985), where jury instructions
mandated under the death penalty statute could be misleading. Therefore, the facts of
each case should be examined closely to determine if the jury properly understood
their role in the sentencing process. However, he analyzed the facts differently, concluding that the jury was not properly instructed, resulting in reversible error. See
supra note 15 and accompanying text.
19. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1289, 729 P.2d at 158, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 891 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
20. Proportionality review requires an independent assessment as to whether the
"punishment imposed is disproportionate to individual culpability." Id at 1286, 729
P.2d at 155, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
Statutory post-sentencing comparative proportionality review may be the best
means of ensuring that a state's statutory capital sentencing scheme is functioning within the eighth amendment guidelines established by [the Supreme
Court]. This review measures the consistency with which sentencing authorities impose the death penalty .... Of the thirty-seven states that presently
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grounds: after acknowledging "an elaborate form of statewide comparative review of sentences in noncapital felony cases," 2 1 Chief Justice Bird asserted that the dissimilarities between felons sentenced to
prison and felons who receive the death penalty are not so great as to
permit a classification that provided proportionality review for one
class of felony conviction but not for another.
The Chief Justice supported her argument by demonstrating that
there were both quantifiable and nonquantifiable circumstances involved in both capital and noncapital cases. Therefore, consistency in
sentencing could have been determined in one class of cases as readily as the other. She concluded, "In sum, no compelling reasons have
been offered which persuade me that capital and noncapital sentencing proceedings are so vastly different as to justify the absence of disparate review in capital cases. Equal protection demands similar
2
treatment here." 2
IV.

CONCLUSION

This case was decided primarily on standard applications of law to
especially egregious facts; mitigating circumstances were virtually absent. The court continues to disagree on the necessity of giving specific jury instructions regarding its ability to make a normative
decision regarding imposition of the death penalty. The adoption of
proportionality review as standard procedure in California death penalty cases is yet to be forthcoming.
RHONDA SCHMIDT

D. An eleven-year-old child's consent to enter a residence to
effect an arrest warrant was held invalid where the
police had no reasonable grounds to believe that the
defendant was inside the residence: People v. Jacobs.
In People v. Jacobs, 43 Cal. 3d 472, 729 P.2d 757, 233 Cal. Rptr. 323
(1987), the defendant was suspected of burglarizing the automobile
permit the death penalty, thirty-one require comparative proportionality review of death sentences.
Special Project, CapitalPunishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuitof Fairness and
Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1189 (1984).
21. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1292, 729 P.2d at 160, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original). See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(f) (West
Supp. 1987). See generally Special Project, supra note 20 (discusses various mechanisms for review in capital cases); Note, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 87 (1984) (discusses Pulley v. Harris, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984), wherein the Supreme
Court held that the eighth amendment does not require comparative proportionality
review in capital cases); Comment, The Dillon Dilemma: Finding ProportionateFelony-Murder Punishments, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 1299 (1984).
22. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1300, 729 P.2d at 165, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 899 (Bird, C.J., concurring and dissenting).

1062

(Vol. 14: 1007, 1987]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

dealership where he had been employed as a janitor. Two specially
manufactured television sets were stolen.
Two police officers, armed with an arrest warrant, went to the defendant's house at approximately 3:20 p.m. The defendant did not
have a daytime job, so the officers expected him to be at home in the
afternoon. The officers knocked at the front door, identified themselves, and were told by the defendant's eleven-year-old stepdaughter
that he was not at home, but would return within an hour. The officers did not believe the child and, therefore, asked her if they could
enter to confirm the defendant's absence. The officers entered the
residence and made a cursory search for the defendant with negative
results.
While in the defendant's living room, the officers saw a specially
manufactured television set, which they seized as evidence. The television set was subsequently admitted into evidence at the defendant's
burglary trial, which resulted in his conviction.
The court of appeal affirmed the conviction. However, the
supreme court's interpretation of the facts in light of the requirements of section 844 of the Penal Code was substantially different,
resulting in reversal of the conviction.
The court first acknowledged that section 844, the "knock-notice"
statute, allows police officers to forcibly enter a residence to effect an
arrest warrant when they reasonably believe that the suspect is hiding within, or that the suspect may flee to avoid arrest. The officers
must first knock at the door and announce their presence and their
purpose to allow the inhabitants an opportunity to respond appropriately. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
The police officers concluded that, because the defendant did not
have a daytime job, he was within his residence, and the defendant's
stepdaughter was lying about his absence. The court was unpersuaded that the officers' belief was statutorily reasonable. See generally 6A C.J.S. Arrest § 49 (1975); Note, The Knock and Demand
Policy: Is it a Necessary Evil?, 2 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 132 (1970).
The court also held that an eleven-year-old child cannot waive the
privacy rights of her parents and, therefore, cannot give police officers valid consent to enter a family residence. The court did not
rule out scenarios wherein a teenager may possess the delegated authority of the parent and validly consent to a police search.
The court ruled that the police did not comply with the knock-notice statute and did not have consent to enter the residence; the court
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therefore held that the television set seized as a result of that entry
was inadmissable evidence. The court found further that its admission by the trial court was prejudicial error.
In this decision, the court seemed to be telling law enforcement officials that absent exigent circumstances, they should take the time
to follow the letter of the law in effecting arrests. Although the officers in this case took the time to secure an arrest warrant, the court
evidently thought they should have taken the same care in serving it.
RHONDA SCHMIDT

E.

The question of prosecutorialdue diligence is subject to
independent appellate review: People v. Louis.

In People v. Louis, 42 Cal. 3d 969, 728 P.2d 180, 232 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1986), the court decided that the prosecution had not exercised due
diligence in securing the presence of a key witness, and thus the preliminary hearing transcript containing the witness's testimony could
not be introduced at trial. Therefore, the court reversed the defendant's conviction and death sentence for murder.
The court first declared that the exercise of due diligence
presented a mixed question of law and fact. In reviewing the trial
court's decisions, the supreme court followed the guidelines concerning mixed questions enunciated in United States v. McConney, 728
F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). At the appellate level, the standard of review differs, depending upon which step
of the process is under review. An issue of fact is subject to the
clearly erroneous standard. Selection of the appropriate rule of law
is subject to de novo review; the application of the rule of law to the
established facts may be either the clearly erroneous standard or the
de novo standard, depending upon the nature of the inquiry.
In the present case, the court noted that the admissibility at trial of
a witness' prior testimony turns on an inquiry into prosecutorial due
diligence in presenting the witness. The court decided that such a determination necessarily involved an analysis and weighing of abstract
constitutional principles, and thus held the de novo standard of review at the appellate level to be most appropriate. The court thereby
overruled People v. Jackson, 28 Cal. 3d 264, 618 P.2d 149, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 603 (1980), to the extent that it held the same question as simply one of fact.
The witness had testified at the preliminary hearings for both
Louis and his co-defendants; and was in custody when the trial began
for the co-defendants. The prosecution knew that the witness's testimony was vital, that the witness lied often, used aliases, and had
failed to show up for his own court dates. Even so, the prosecution
1064
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arranged for the witness's release on his own recognizance in exchange for his testimony at trial. The witness disappeared following
his release.
In discussing the requirements of the duty of due diligence, the
supreme court emphasized that the prosecution was under a stringent obligation: first, to make every effort to make an absent witness
present; and second, to use reasonable means to insure that the witness does not purposely become unavailable to testify. Since the
prosecution did not keep the witness under surveillance, and failed to
obtain an accurate address prior to his release, the court held that
the prosecutor did not meet this duty. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1291
(West 1966 & Supp. 1987); see also 31 CAL. JUR. 3D Evidence § 232
(1976).
By overruling Jackson, the court has relegated the question of due
diligence to a category of issues that receives de novo review on appeal, the same category that includes such questions as exigent circumstances and probable cause. Although the court was greatly
influenced by the facts of this case, this decision could also be read as
imposing an extraordinary burden on the prosecution to keep witnesses under constant surveillance before trial.
RHONDA SCHMIDT

F. Warrantless aerialsurveillance of a person's marijuana
garden is not an unconstitutionalsearch when the garden
is not within the curtilage of a home: People v. Mayoff.
In People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 729 P.2d 166, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2
(1986), the court affirmed its previous holdings that law enforcement
agencies may constitutionally observe open fields since there is no legitimate expectation of privacy. See generally Matens, The Fourth
Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 551 (1984); 20 CAL. JUR. 3D (Rev.) Criminal Law § 2516 (1985).
The defendant's marijuana cultivation was discovered as a result of
random aerial surveillance of rural areas in a marijuana eradication
program. The police officers took pictures of the defendant's land,
using a telephoto lens, at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. A
search warrant was then issued and marijuana was discovered. The
defendant was charged with cultivation of marijuana.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the aerial surveillance violated his constitutional right to privacy and his right against unreasonable searches
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and seizures. The defendant was sentenced to six months in jail and
two years probation. The defendant appealed, reasserting his constitutional claims.
The defendant's land was very isolated and not viewable from the
road. It was connected to the road by a dirt path on which bystanders could see only the tops of the defendant's buildings. The police
officers viewed two gardens. Only one of the gardens was fenced.
However, both of the gardens were surrounded by wilderness and
steep slopes. The gardens were at least two hundred feet from the
defendant's trailers and there was no fence enclosing the trailers and
gardens together.
The court focused on whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy. See generally People v. Cook, 41 Cal. 3d 373, 710
P.2d 299, 221 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1985). Although the United States
Supreme Court had recently decided Californiav. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct.
1809 (1986), concluding that aerial surveillance of the curtilage area is
not constitutionally protected, the California Supreme Court held
that the California Constitution was independent of the United
States Constitution insofar as it may afford individuals greater protection. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 24. The court followed the holding
in Oliver v. United States 466 U.S. 170 (1984). In Oliver, the United
States Supreme Court held that that there was a legitimate expectation of privacy in one's home, and the curtilage surrounding the
home, but not in open fields. However, the court concluded that the
crops observed were not within the curtilage of the defendant's trailers, that they were at least two hundred feet away and not enclosed.
The court dismissed defendant's argument that the telephoto lens
constituted an unwarranted intrusion. Although the pictures were
taken with the telephoto equipment, the court reasoned that they
were not any more accurate in scale than one can see with a "naked
eye." The court further noted that the details of human activity
could not be observed through the lens.
The defendant unsuccessfully contended that the observations
were unconstitutional since the open fields were observed in relation
to his curtilage and home. The court held that the mere unavoidable
and incidental observation of protected property does not transform
the viewing of the open fields into an unconstitutional search.
"There is a difference ... between surveillance focused on a particular residential yard ...

and .

.

. surveillance which concentrates on

open fields and merely notices their relationship to nearby habitation." Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d at 1316-17, 729 P.2d at 174, 233 Cal. Rptr. at
10.
The defendant also argued that the police officers lacked probable
cause since they could not have actually identified the marijuana
1066
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plants from 1,000 feet in the air. The officers contended that they
had drawn upon their experience and were familiar with the typical
crop patterns of marijuana. Further, they stated that the temporary
nature of the buildings confirmed their suspicions. The court stated
that probable cause was a factual issue, so it would not disturb the
lower court's findings.
Finally, the court focused on the balancing of particular privacy expectations and the nature of the governmental intrusion to determine
whether the surveillance was unreasonable. See, e.g., New Jersey v.
TL.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). The court concluded the balance tipped in
favor of the surveillance since it may have been the only feasible
means in which to police the remote, dangerous, and otherwise inaccessible lands.
The court extended the "open fields" doctrine in that the government may now observe constitutionally protected areas, such as a
home and its curtilage, in relation to the surrounding open fields.
Moreover, the court noted in dictum that Proposition 8 (article 1, section 28(d) of the California Constitution) now provides that relevant
evidence may not be excluded in a criminal proceeding. Therefore,
only criminal evidence excluded by the standards of the United
States Constitution must be excluded in California. Since this case
arose prior to 1982, when Proposition 8 was passed, the pre-1982 California Constitution was still applicable.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

G.

The standard of review for violation of the state
constitutionalright to an interpreteris whether the error
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: People v.
Rodriguez.

In People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 1005, 728 P.2d 202, 232 Cal. Rptr.
132 (1986), the court heard the appeal of the defendants Juan and
Barbaro Rodriguez. Both were found guilty of kidnapping. In addition, Juan was convicted for discharging a firearm at an inhabited
dwelling, while personally using a firearm. All charges stemmed
from the events of September 10, 1982, revolving around the loss and
attempted recovery of a chain belonging to Juan.
Juan Rodriguez arrived at a party during the early morning hours.
Once there, Juan allowed Mario Ruiz, nephew of the party host, to
wear his chain. At dawn Raul Huerta arrived, but departed soon
thereafter in Juan's automobile, with Mario and two others, to go to
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the store. Upon their return, Juan demanded the keys to his car and
the return of his chain. Having been rebuked in his request for the
chain, Juan left.
However, Juan soon returned with his cousin, Barbaro, and a .32
caliber handgun. Again demanding the return of his chain, Juan
fired a single round at the house, and then pointed the gun at Huerta,
compelling him to enter the car to assist in the relocation of the
chain. Unsuccessful in their quest at the home of Mario's mother,
the expedition returned to the original scene. The police arrived,
having been summoned after the shots, and immediately apprehended Barbaro. Juan was found hiding nearby.
Several details concerning the incident were disputed. Despite
prosecution testimony to the contrary, and the fact that .32 caliber
ammunition was found on Barbaro's person, both Juan and Barbaro
denied the use of a weapon in forcing Huerta's cooperation in finding
the chain. In their defense, they both testified that Huerta accompanied them voluntarily.
At the joint preliminary hearing two interpreters were sworn, one
to assist Huerta for the prosecution, the other for the defendants.
Again, at the beginning of trial, two interpreters were sworn to assist
the defendants. As the trial progressed, the translators were sometimes enlisted to aid non-English speaking witnesses. However, the
services of one of the interpreters, Mona Rich, was primarily reserved for the defendants. At the conclusion of this trial, Juan and
Barbaro Rodriguez were convicted and sentenced.
On appeal, the primary issue upon which the court focused was
whether the Spanish-speaking defendants were improperly denied
the full-time assistance of an interpreter. Peripheral questions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the exercise of discretion by
the trial court in excluding evidence, and the denial of probation to
Juan were summarily dismissed as being without merit in the latter
part of the opinion.
Justice Lucas, writing for the court, first turned to People v. Aguilar, 35 Cal. 3d 785, 677 P.2d 1198, 200 Cal. Rptr. 908 (1984), to review
the duties of the translator in fulfilling a defendant's right to an interpreter established by article I, section 14 of the California Constitution. The Aguilar decision recited the three basic roles for an
interpreter: (1) to interpret the questions and answers of non-English
speaking witnesses; (2) to advance the defendant's understanding of
the judicial process; and (3) to enable the defendant to consult with
his English-speaking attorney. Id. at 790, 677 P.2d at 1201, 200 Cal.
Rptr. at 911. See also Comment, Interpretersfor the Defense: Due
Processfor the Non-English-SpeakingDefendant, 63 CAL. L. REV. 801
(1975). However, Aguilar only reaffirmed the importance of the
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presence of an interpreter throughout the proceedings; the decision
did not establish a standard of review to be applied.
Justice Lucas supplied three possible tests for reversal if an interpreter was improperly denied. The first, a per se standard requiring
automatic reversal for a violation, was rejected. As in People v. Bigelow, 37 Cal. 3d 731, 691 P.2d 994, 209 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1984), the utility
of a per se standard is dependent upon the character of the right involved or the impossibility of later identifying prejudice. Because
there are circumstances where the absence of an interpreter would
not lead to substantial prejudice, the per se standard was seen as
unnecessary.
The second possible standard for violations of state constitutional
rights was established in People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 299 P.2d
243 (1956). The test is whether it is "reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached
in the absence of the error." Id. at 836, 299 P.2d at 254. The court
avoided the application of a Watson standard by noting that there
the situation implicated numerous federally guaranteed rights. The
court was more comfortable in adopting a third approach presented
in Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967). Under the Chapman
standard, a federal constitutional error may be deemed harmless only
if the appellate court was "able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24. The reviewing court must
make two inquiries under this standard. First, it must look at the entire record to determine whether the error might have materially influenced the jury in its verdict. Second, the court must weigh the
impact of the error in the course of the trial.
Applying this test to these particular facts, the court was unable to
find within the record a situation where the defendants' ability to
communicate or comprehend was impeded. The court suggested that
the best and preferred means of avoiding similar complaints would
have been to require that each defendant have an interpreter assigned to him, who would remain at his side throughout the proceedings. However, nothing in the record demonstrated any difficulties
arising from the use of a shared interpreter. The court distinguished
People v. Menchaca, 146 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 194 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1983),
in which the court found that because of the shared interpreter, the
defendant did not understand much of what occurred at the trial.
Since the record was totally devoid of any objections made by the defendants at trial, the court refused to speculate whether some material interruption in access to the interpreter may have occurred.
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It appears from the holding in this case that an attorney must object at the trial level to the use of a shared interpreter. At the very
least, the record must reveal some indication that the defendants'
comprehension of the proceedings was compromised. The court did,
however, leave open the possibility fol: a defendant to utilize a habeas
corpus proceeding where the record itself is devoid of concrete evidence showing conflict.
TRAVIS P. CLARDY

H. It is reversible error to refuse a jury instruction
regardingthe effect of psychologicalfactors on eyewitness
identificationswhen the defendant's identification is
crucial to the issue of guilt: People v. Wright.
In People v. Wright, 43 Cal. 3d 399, 729 P.2d 280, 233 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1987), the court considered the issue of whether a jury instruction
was required regarding 1) psychological factors influencing the reliability of eyewitness identification and 2) a cautionary instruction as to
the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications. The court
found that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to
give such instructions when the identification was necessary to connect the defendant with the crime.
The defendant was convicted of armed robbery. The only evidence
linking him with the crime was an eyewitness identification alleging
that the defendant was seen at the scene of the crime with several
other men with stockings over their heads. At the close of the defendant's case, he properly requested certain jury instructions. One
of those requested instructions dealt with the psychological factors
that could affect the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Another involved a caution regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony generally. The trial court denied the requested
instructions and the defendant appealed. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's decision.
In its analysis, the supreme court chose not to follow the numerous
contrary holdings of the courts of appeal regarding the "psychological
factor" instruction. See, e.g., People v. Ware, 78 Cal. App. 3d 822, 144
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1978); People v. Boothe, 65 Cal. App. 3d 685, 135 Cal.
Rptr. 570 (1977); People v. Kelley, 75 Cal. App. 3d 672, 142 Cal. Rptr.
457 (1977). Instead, the court adopted the holding set forth in People
v. Guzman, 47 Cal. App. 3d 380, 121 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1975). The Guzman court allowed the "psychological factor" instruction which was
requested by the defendant in the present case. The Guzman instruction was originally developed in the case of United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The instruction created
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guidelines for juries to use in assessing the credibility of witness
identifications.
The court then discussed the use of the cautionary instruction regarding the inherent unreliability of eyewitness identifications. The
court reasoned that such an instruction serves to insure that the jury
understands its responsibilities, and the defendant was entitled to
this instruction upon proper request. The majority concluded that
the omission of these instructions was prejudicial error, since the
risks inherent in eyewitness identification are well-founded, and failure to inform the jury of these concerns may have affected the verdict. Finally, the court included two jury instructions in the
appendix of the opinion for use in cases of eyewitness testimony.
Wright, 43 Cal. 3d at 434-35, 729 P.2d at 296-97, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 10506.
JAMES A. COULTER, III
V.

EVIDENCE
A.

Requirement that a criminal defendant make
"reasonableefforts" to secure attendance of an adverse
witness at the preliminary hearing to avert admission of
written statements as substituted testimony was
unconstitutional;admission of such affidavit was
harmless error where other sufficient evidence was
shown to support a finding of probable cause: Mills v.
Superior Court.

In Mills v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 3d 951, 728 P.2d 211, 232 Cal.
Rptr. 141 (1986), the supreme court was faced with deciding the constitutionality of section 872 of the Penal Code [hereinafter section
872]. The court's conclusion as to the constitutionality is unclear.
The lead opinion, written by Justice Mosk, intimated that section 872
was unconstitutional in its entirety. However, the opinion mentioned
specifically only subsections (b) and (c). Justice Reynoso's separate
concurring and dissenting opinion, with which Justices Bird and
Broussard concurred, stated that it concurred with holding section
872(b) unconstitutional, and made no mention of the statute as a
whole or of subsection (c). Justice Panelli separately concurred and
dissented, with Justices Grodin and Lucas joining. Justice Panelli objected to the court's ruling that section 872(c) was unconstitutional,
making no reference to any other subsections of section 872. Thus,
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the subsections of section 872 will be referred to generically as section 872.
The accused was charged with auto burglary. Pursuant to section
872, the defendant made a demand by phone that the prosecution
produce the victim of the alleged auto burglary as a witness at the
preliminary hearing, rather than substituting an affidavit for the live
testimony. Nevertheless, the prosecution offered the victim's affidavit at the hearing, arguing that a telephone call was not sufficient to
satisfy section 872's requirement of "reasonable efforts" to procure
personal testimony. In addition, the prosecution presented as evidence eyewitness testimony by the arresting police officer. The magistrate ruled that the defendant's telephone call did not meet the
"reasonable efforts" requirement. Thus, the affidavit was admitted
and the defendant was held to answer on a charge of auto burglary.
The defendant responded with a writ of prohibition which was denied by the court of appeals.
The supreme court decided that section 872 must be scrutinized to
prevent unconstitutional restrictions on the appellant's right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing. See generally 21 CAL.
JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2710, 2712 (1984).
The court first analyzed the "reasonable efforts" requirement of
section 872. See generally Review of Selected 1981 Legislation, 13
PAC. L.J. 513, 664-65 (1982). The court determined that "reasonable
efforts" required more than a mere telephone call. While the opinion
recognized that a court of appeal held that telephone calls were "reasonable efforts" in People v. Haney, 156 Cal. App. 3d 109, 202 Cal.
Rptr. 579 (1984), Haney was distinguished from the instant case. In
Haney, the court found that several attempts to contact the victim by
phone were sufficient; however, appellant Mills' single telephone request was not. Thus, the court found that section 872 was not satisfied in the case at hand.
However, the court found that its own definition of "reasonable efforts" placed an unacceptable burden on criminal defendants. The
court reasoned that such a standard implied the use of the subpoena
process and the contacting of the witness personally to urge appearance for cross-examination in court. Finding that this created a duty
which improperly reduced the prosecution's responsibility to present
evidence sufficient to show probable cause, the court concluded that
section 872 contravened the defendant's due process rights at his preliminary hearing. In addition, the statute was found to be overly
broad because it failed to limit use of hearsay affidavits to peripheral
witnesses, thus allowing the possible use of affidavits for critical
testimony.
Finally, the court viewed the effect of this decision on the appel1072
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lant's case. The record revealed that the arresting officer's eyewitness testimony fulfilled the probable cause requirement and that
there was sufficient evidence upon which to hold the defendant to
answer without testimony in any form by the alleged victim. Thus,
the court concluded that the admission of the affidavits was harmless
error and discharged the writ.
SARAH

A.

FUHRMAN

B. A witness may not testify after having undergone
hypnosis. A warrantlessparole-orientedsearch may be
conducted even when the parolee is incarcerated. People
v. Johnson.
In People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d 296, 730 P.2d 131, 233 Cal. Rptr. 562
(1987), the supreme court unanimously reiterated the objectionability
of testimony given by a person who had undergone hypnosis. In order to facilitate an accurate description of a rape victim's assailant,
the victim was hypnotized. This description led to the apprehension
of the defendant. Tangible evidence existed which connected the
rapist with a prior murder. Over the defendant's objection, the rape
victim was allowed to testify and give an in-court identification. This
testimony led to the defendant's convictions of both the rape and the
murder, for which he was sentenced to death.
In overturning the conviction, the court relied upon People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860 (1982). The California Supreme Court in Shirley held that
the testimony of a witness who had been hypnotized was per se inadmissible. See generally 21 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3224 (1985);
Annotation, Admissibility of Hypnotic Evidence at Criminal'Trial,
92 A.L.R. 3D 442 (1979). Although it was conceded that Shirley was
applicable, the respondent contended that the error committed was
harmless. The court found that even though Shirley did not mandate
per se reversal, a miscarriage of justice would result if the conviction
was allowed to stand because the primary inculpatory evidence was
given by the victim who had been hypnotized. Thus, the court reversed the conviction of guilt and the sentence of death and remanded for a new trial.
The defendant also appealed the admission of certain evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search of his residence. At the
suppression hearing, the judge ruled that the search was proper as a
parole-oriented search. When the defendant was released from
1073

prison in 1978, he signed a "Notice and Conditions of Parole" which
contained a clause that provided that his premises were subject to
warrantless search for one year. After eight months had passed, the
defendant's parole status was placed on hold due to an arrest for parole violations. He served six months because of the violations and
following his release, he was still subject to the unexpired four
months remaining on his original parole. The search in question in
the present case occurred during this four month period. Since no
new "Notice" was given or signed following the defendant's parole
holding period, the court held that the defendant was still subject to
the conditions of the original parole. Thus, the court rejected the defendant's contention that he lacked notice.
The defendant's alternative contention was that the search was invalid as a parole-oriented search because he was incarcerated at the
time of the search, and therefore the search was aimed primarily at
law enforcement and not at parolee supervision. In rejecting this argument, the court overruled the portion of People v. Coffman, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 681, 82 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969), which implied that the imprisonment of the parolee at the time of the search removed reasonable
parolee supervision interests. The court provided that a parole-oriented search was constitutional as long as "there [was] a reasonable
nexus (a direct and close relationship) between the search and the
parole process, and a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts,
that the parolee ha[d] violated the terms of his parole or engaged in
criminal activity." Johnson, 43 Cal. 3d at 316, 730 P.2d at 143-44, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 575 (citing People v. Burgener,41 Cal. 3d 505, 533-35, 714
P.2d 1251, 1269-71, 224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 130-32 (1986)). See generally
Annotation, Validity, Under Fourth Amendment, of Warrantless
Search of Parolee or His Property by Parole Officer, 32 A.L.R. FED.
155 (1977). The court concluded that since the defendant's parole officer had initiated the search based upon solid evidence that the defendant had a gun, the search was valid as parole-oriented.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT

C. Statements obtainedfrom a criminal defendant in
violation of the privilege against self-incriminationare
inadmissible as affirmative evidence as well as for
impeachment purposes: People v. May.
In People v. May, 43 Cal. 3d 436, 729 P.2d 778, 233 Cal. Rptr. 344
(1987), the court declined to adopt the holding of the United States
Supreme Court in Harrisv. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), which established that statements made in violation of a criminal defendant's
Miranda rights were admissible for impeachment purposes as long as
the statements were made voluntarily. In this case, the defendant
1074

[Vol. 14: 1007, 1987]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

was convicted of rape. During the jury trial, evidence of the defendant's statements, made to police in violation of his privilege against
self-incrimination, were introduced for impeachment purposes. The
appellate court affirmed the conviction.
In reviewing the case, the court considered two issues. First, it considered whether article 1, section 28(d) of the California Constitution
[hereinafter 28(d)], which provides that all relevant evidence is admissible, mandates the court to admit such statements insofar as the
United States Constitution allows. Second, the court considered
whether, if 28(d) did not apply, it should overrule the rule established in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 360 (1976) in favor of the Harris decision.
The defendant argued that the lower court erred in admitting his
custodial testimony for impeachment purposes. He relied upon Disbrow, which concluded that statements made in violation of Miranda
were inadmissible for impeachment purposes. The prosecution contended that 28(d) nullified Disbrow. After much discussion, the court
agreed with the defendant, relying on specific language embodied in
28(d) which states that "[nlothing in this section shall affect an existing statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege . . . ." CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 28(d). The court noted that section 940 of the Evidence Code, which provides that "a person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him," is a statutory
privilege; and that all privileges shall be liberally construed. CAL.
EVID. CODE § 940 (West 1986). See Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951). The court further stated that since section 940 of
the Evidence Code does not divulge the scope of the privilege, its
scope must be interpreted by the courts. Hence, the court held that
Disbrow continued to be the governing law in California.
The court rejected the prosecutor's contention that, even if Disbrow survives section 28(d), Disbrow should be overruled, and that
the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris should be
adopted in its place. In reaching its conclusion, the court first reiterated the arguments it had made earlier in deciding Disbrow. Second,
the court stated that it did not agree with the underlying reasoning
in the Harris decision. It disagreed with Harris'sprecedential treatment of Miranda, as well as the policy arguments set forth in the
decision.
In conclusion, the court held that the trial court erred in holding
that the defendant's statements made in violation of his privilege
against self-incrimination were admissible for impeachment pur1075

poses. However, since the defendant did not testify, the case was remanded to determine the prejudicial effect of the error.
This case emphasizes that in some instances, even with the adoption of 28(d), the California Constitution still provides the criminal
defendant with greater rights than the federal constitution.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

VI.

INSURANCE LAW
Insurancecompanies' duty of good faith andfair dealing
extends to informing insureds about their rights under a
policy when lack of knowledge may lead to loss of
benefits or forfeiture of rights: Sarchett v. Blue Shield of
California.

In Sarchett v. Blue Shield of California, 43 Cal. 3d 1, 729 P.2d 267,
233 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1987) (plurality opinion), modified, 43 Cal. 3d 516b
(1987), the court held that the defendant had breached its duty of
good faith and fair dealing when it failed to inform the plaintiff of his
right to an impartial review and arbitration upon the event of a disputed claim. The defendant argued that because this right was
clearly set forth in the policy, it had no duty to reiterate this right to
the plaintiff. The trial court held that the defendant breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to pay plaintiff's hospital bills, disputing the treating physician's judgment that hospitalization was necessary, and failing to inform the defendant about the
review and arbitration right contained in the policy. The plaintiff
was awarded hospital costs, $20,000 in compensatory damages, and
$80,000 in punitive damages.
The plaintiff purchased a policy from the defendant in 1966. In
1976, the plaintiff was hospitalized by his physician after complaining
of fatigue, swelling of the stomach, tremors, and other symptoms.
His blood count also appeared abnormal. The plaintiff's doctor concluded that the plaintiff might be suffering from an ulcer or leukemia and ordered a hospital stay. The defendant paid for all of the
plaintiff's testing and medical bills, but did not pay for the bills due
to the hospital stay, claiming that hospitalization for diagnostic purposes that are not medically necessary are excluded from coverage.
After six months of repeated refusals to pay plaintiff's claim, the defendant mentioned the "possibility" of peer review.
The court rejected the lower court's finding that the policy was
ambiguous since it did not state who would determine whether the
specific policy exclusions were applicable. The lower court had reasoned that in absence of specific language to the contrary, insureds
should be able to rely upon their doctor's advice in determining
1076
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whether or not hospitalization was necessary. After reviewing the
policy, the supreme court declared that the policy was not ambiguous. The policy had a separate "Settlement of Disputes" provision
which stated that all disputes concerning therapeutic justification
were to be resolved by an appropriate medical society or by arbitration. The court rejected the lower court's holding that the ambiguity
could be cured only by a statement of the settlement agreement in
the medical necessity exclusion provisions. See generally 39 CAL.
JUR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage § 251 (1977).
The plaintiff next asserted that even if the policy was not ambiguous, the coverage should have extended to the reasonable expectations of the insured. The court rejected this argument, stating that
the insured would not be reasonable to expect that all recommendations made by a doctor are automatically covered by his or her policy.
Rather, the insured should expect that his or her treating physician
has recommended necessary treatment. The court concluded that the
insured's expectations could be protected, not by granting doctors an
unbridled discretion to determine what was necessary, but by construing the language of the policy liberally to favor the insured.
Finally, the plaintiff argued that public policy required that hospitalization should be covered when ordered by a treating physician.
Otherwise, insureds would be placed in the position of defying the
doctor's orders or risking liability on large hospital bills. The court
rejected this argument on the basis that it would reduce the amount
of choices among types of policy coverage and would place doctors in
a position in which it would be quite easy to perpetuate fraud.
Therefore, the court stated liberal interpretation in favor of the insured was the best that it could do for insureds.
However, the court affirmed the trial court's determination that
the defendant had an affirmative duty to inform the plaintiff of his
rights under the settlement clause of the policy. The court's decision
was based upon the "'special nature of the insurer-insured relationship and the resultant duties which an insurer owes to its insureds.'"
Sarchett, 43 Cal. 3d at 14, 729 P.2d at 276, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 85 (citations omitted). Included in this relationship is the duty to "'bring
the insured's attention to relevant information so as to enable the insured to take action to secure rights afforded by the policy.'" Id. (citations and italics omitted). Since this was the only breach of duty
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that the court found, it remanded the case to the trial court to determine the appropriate amount of damages for this breach alone.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

VII.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
A.

The State of Californiais not required to reimburse local
governments for statutes that result in some incidental
cost to local agencies, but is required only to provide
subvention when new programs are enacted that impose
unique requirements on local governments not applying
to all state residents: County of Los Angeles v. State of

California.
In County of Los Angeles v. State of California,43 Cal. 3d 46, 729
P.2d 202, 233 Cal. Rptr. 38, the court interpreted article XIII B, section 6 of the California Constitution [hereinafter section 6]. This provision, adopted on November 6, 1979 by the voters on an initiative
measure, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "Whenever the Legislature or any state agency mandates a new program or higher level
of service on any local government, the state shall provide a subvention of funds to reimburse such local government for the costs of
such program or increased level of service . . . ." CAL. CONST. art.
XIII B, § 6. The present action arose out of the adoption by the legislature of laws increasing the amounts which employers, including local governments, are required to pay in certain workers'
compensation benefits. The Counties of Los Angeles and San Bernardino and the City of San Diego claimed section 6 applied to this
enactment and, therefore, the state was required to reimburse them
for the expenses incurred as a result of the payment of increased
benefits.
The court focused on what the voters intended when they adopted
section 6. The court concluded the voters intended to require the
state to reimburse local governments only for the costs involved in
carrying out those functions peculiar to government. Thus, a "program" was defined by the court as a governmental public service or
as a unique requirement imposed upon the local governments by the
state,
Applying this construction of section 6 to the payment of the new
benefits under the workers' compensation laws, the court held that
the construction had no application. The court found workers' compensation was not a program to provide service to the public. Addi-
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tionally, section 6 did not apply since the workers' compensation laws
applied generally to all state residents.
JAMES A. COULTER, III

B. A municipally owned water company charging
nonresidentshigher ratesfor water service than residents,
does not violate nonresidents' equal protection rights,
provided the differential rests on a reasonablebasis other
than residential status: Hansen v. City of San
Buenaventura.
In Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura,' the court decided the issues of whether a municipal water company's imposition of a rate
structure yielding returns in excess of costs was proper, and whether
the method used to calculate the city's rate scheme was unfair to
nonresidents. The plaintiffs brought a class action challenging the
City of San Buenaventura's [hereinafter the City] ordinance attaching a seventy percent surcharge to nonresidents of the City for water
supplied by the City's water company.
The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and damages, alleging that
the surcharge was unreasonable and discriminatory, and that the underlying rate structure denied them equal protection under the law.
The trial court validated the City's surcharge and rate structure, but
the court of appeal reversed the trial court.
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Since 1923, the City has owned and operated its own municipal
water facility. Through several issues of general bonds in subsequent
years, the City has raised funds to expand and modernize its water
supplying capacity. These bonds entailed the imposition of a lien
upon all private property within the City, so that in the event the
bonds went unpaid, the bondholders could levy taxes on that property. To further subsidize its water operations, portions of the City's
general funds were allocated to the water project from time to time,
and loans from the fund were extended at little or no interest. In ad1. 42 Cal. 3d 1172, 729 P.2d 186, 233 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1986). Justice Grodin wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Reynoso, Lucas, and Panelli concurring. Justice
Broussard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion with Chief Justice Bird
concurring.
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dition, City residents subsidized the water project and its expansion
by paying power taxes and connection and acreage fees.
The water system was expanded in 1966 when the City purchased
the Mound Water Company [hereinafter Mound], a small mutual
water company 2 which served nonresidents of the City. The users of
the Mound water approved the sale. The transaction agreement provided that the Mound users at the time of sale would continue to receive water "at the regularly established rates for water service from
the Ventura Water System," 3 but did not preclude the City from
charging higher rates to nonresident users. In fact, it was the City's
practice for over thirty years to apply rate differentials on the basis
of resident/nonresident status. 4 When the existing Mound wells
proved to be polluted, the City began servicing the prior Mound customers by its own water system, greatly increasing the quality and
accessibility of the water received by the Mound customers.
In 1969, the City obtained a second water company, the Saticoy
Water Company [hereinafter Saticoy]. Saticoy was an investor-owned
public utility; forty percent of the customers were nonresidents of
the City. However, these nonresidents were given the opportunity to
vote in a City election to approve the sale to the City. Nearly ninety
percent of those customers who voted approved the transaction and,
despite the opportunity to challenge the sale before the Public Utilities Commission, no objections were reportedly raised by the Saticoy
customers.
Under the terms of the Saticoy/Ventura transaction, the City was
free to alter the rates after an initial sixty-day rate freeze, so long as
the amended rates were not unreasonably discriminatory with respect to customers' residence status. Like the prior Mound customers, the existing Saticoy customers benefited from the company's new
ownership. The Saticoy wells were substandard, and the company's
storage capacity was slight. After the City acquired Saticoy, the company's users enjoyed improved access to higher quality water than
before.
As a result of the City's acquisition of these two companies, and
the concomitant obligations providing water to those companies' customers, the City was burdened with increased expenses. It was required to purchase supplementary sources of water at a greater
2. A mutual water company is "any private corporation or association organized
for the purposes of delivering water to its stockholders and members at cost, including
use of works for conserving, treating and reclaiming water." CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE
§ 2725 (West 1975).
3. Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1177, 729 P.2d at 188, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
4. Since 1935, the City had charged higher rates to out-of-city water customers,
varying from a low of 32 percent (1952-1972), to the present surcharge of 70 percent.
Id. at 1177 n.2, 729 P.2d at 188 n.2, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 24 n.2.
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expense than that of local Ventura well waters.5 Under an agreement with the state, from whom part of the extra water was obtained, the City would be required to impose taxes, payable by City
residents only, should City revenues be insufficient to pay for the
6
state water.
In addition, the existing Mound and Saticoy storage, pumping, and
transmission facilities were inefficient, forcing the City to expend
millions of dollars to expand and revamp its own facilities. To replenish the funds being expended, the City increased the existing
surcharge on water sold to nonresidents to seventy percent.
II.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Grodin commenced by offering a number of general rules.7
He pointed out that a city which takes over another community's
water system is obligated as a trustee to conduct itself fairly with
that community's customers and must not charge unreasonable rates
for its services. 8 Furthermore, the challenging party has the burden
of proving unreasonableness, since the existing rate will be presumed
fair. 9
The court remarked that where a rate differential rests solely upon
residential status, unreasonableness will be found.10 However, rate
differentials may properly rest on some other reasonable basis. The
court recognized that "[r]easonableness ...is the beginning and end
of the judicial inquiry."ll
5. This supplemental water was purchased from the Casitas Municipal Water
District, and other sources, and ranged in price from $56 to $61 an acre foot at the time
of the trial in 1978. By comparison, the cost of Ventura well water ran from $20 to $25
an acre foot. Id. at 1179 n.3, 729 P.2d at 189 n.3, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.3.
6. The expense incurred in transporting the state water, estimated at over $50
million, would also be shouldered entirely by city residents. Id. at 1179, 729 P.2d at
189, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
7. See generally 33 WEST'S CALIFORNIA DIGEST, 711 Municipal Corporations
(1982); 42 WEST'S CALIFORNIA DIGEST, 203(5) Water & Water Courses (1982).
8. County of Inyo v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 26 Cal. 3d 154, 159, 604 P.2d 566, 569,
161 Cal. Rptr. 172, 175 (1980).
9. Elliot v. City of Pacific Grove, 54 Cal. App. 3d 53, 58, 126 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374
(1975).
10. County of Inyo, 26 Cal. 3d at 159 n.4, 604 P.2d at 569 n.4, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 175
n.4.
11. Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1181, 729 P.2d at 190, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 26. Further, the
court in American Microsystems, Inc. v. City of Santa Clara, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1037, 187
Cal. Rptr. 550 (1982) stated, "[I]t is not the function of the courts to evaluate the wisdom of the City's rate-fixing decisions. [We] may only consider that narrower legal
question whether the rates were unreasonable or arbitrarily established." Id. at 1044,
187 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
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A.

Reasonablenessof Municipal Utility Earning Profit

In finding the City's rate differential to be reasonable, the court rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that a city must limit rates charged to
those necessary to cover the bare costs of providing water to its users.
In disposing of this contention, the court recognized that the cost-ofservice analysis employed by the City's accountants in calculating the
disputed surcharge focused primarily upon depreciation, which did
not provide for facility replacement. The court concluded that the
City's imposition of rates granting a return on investment (i.e. profit)
was reasonable under these circumstances, since municipal utilities
would otherwise have little incentive to expand their facilities to
meet the needs of nonresident customers.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation of section
54514 of the Government Code 12 as authority for the proposition that
the City was required to furnish water at cost. The court concluded
13
that the section phrase "consistent with ... prudent management"'
authorized the utility to reap a reasonable return. The court reasoned that "a municipal utility would be foolish to increase its business risk by expanding service to nonresidents without getting some
14
type of return commensurate with the increased risk."'
In addition, the court cited authority to support the proposition
that a city is not limited to charging bare costs for services provided,15 and suggested further that the state legislature's refusal to
bring municipal utility companies under the Public Utilities Commission's jurisdiction indicated that body was satisfied with the current
16
state of the law.
7
B. Reasonableness of Discrepancy In Rates Charged1

The court next discussed the validity of the discrepancy between
the rate of return imposed by the City on residents vis-a-vis that
charged to nonresidents.'S The court approved the City's practice of
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54514 (West 1983).
13. Id.
14. Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1188, 729 P.2d at 195, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
15. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. v. Luehring, 4 Cal. App. 3d 204, 215, 84 Cal. Rptr.
291, 299 (1970) (approving city's use of "net proceeds" from fees collected for services
provided to benefit its own general fund); Beard v. City & County of San Francisco, 79
Cal. App. 2d 753, 755, 180 P.2d 744, 746 (1947) (authorizing operation of public facilities
for profit).
16. The court was also persuaded by the City's accountants' determination that a
surcharge in excess of the seventy percent imposed would have been appropriate
under the circumstances, and the fact that the Public Utilities Commission had approved other local government rate differentials in excess of seventy percent. Hansen,
42 Cal. 3d at 1182, 729 P.2d at 192, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
17. See generally 94 C.J.S. Waters § 289 (1956).
18.
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charging a lower rate to residents, observing that only residents
shouldered the risks and cost burdens associated with the operation,
maintenance, and expansion of the City's water system. Among
other things, the court referred to the taxes and connection fees paid
by residents, and noted that only their property was subject to the
bond and state liens.
As further support for the validity of the City's imposition of the
seventy percent surcharge, the court cited the increased benefits enjoyed by the nonresident customers from the City's acquisition of the
Mound and Saticoy projects. In the words of the court, "the former
Mound and Saticoy customers immediately received substantial benefits such as improved water quality, increased water storage, [and]
upgraded fire protection ... ."19 Although residents of the City also
received benefits from the new, more expensive water acquired from
other sources, the court was quick to point out that the cost of the
transported water was allocated between residents and nonresidents
of the City.
The plaintiffs also challenged the City's method of calculating the
rate base, arguing that the existing scheme permitted the City to
reap a double return. The court disagreed, and approved the City's
inclusion in its rate base of "any facilities donated by developers or
financed through connection and acreage fees," 20 holding that doing
so did not result in double payment by past rate payers under the cir21
cumstances of the instant case.
C. Equal Protection Challenge
The plaintiffs claimed that they were politically powerless to influence the City's water rate decisions, and thus constituted a "suspect
class." The City's disparate rate structure, they argued, should therefore be analyzed under a "strict scrutiny" standard. The court declined to confer suspect class status upon the nonresidents, for
although they lacked the right to vote in city elections, other meththat charged nonresidents was 8.67%. Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1183, 729 P.2d at 192, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 28.
19. Id. at 1185, 729 P.2d at 194, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
20. Id. at 1186, 729 P.2d at 194, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 30. "The rate base on which a
return may be earned is the amount of property used and useful, at the time of the
rate inquiry, in rendering a designated utility service." PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY REGULATION, 139 (1969).

21. Cf. Pacific Tel. & Tel. v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 62 Cal. 2d 634, 664, 401 P.2d
353, 371, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1965) (utility disallowed from including in rate base donations or assets supplied by ratepayers, where double return would result).
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ods for exercising political influence, including rate hearings and lobbying, were available to them.
Finding no suspect class, the court applied a "rational basis" test 22
to the existing rate structure, and concluded that, since the rate
scheme had passed the reasonableness test applicable to municipal
utility rates, it had a fortiori satisfied the rational basis standard.
The court concluded that the rates imposed by the City were reasonable, and the factors relied upon in their calculation were proper.
III.

JUSTICE BROUSSARD'S CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Broussard agreed with the majority to the extent that the
majority stated approval of a city's charging nonresidents higher
rates than residents as a means of compensating the City for revenues expended to fund its water company facilities and services. His
dissent condemned the City's inflated rate for nonresidents in the instant case because the capital improvements and conditions provided
by the City were disproportionate to revenue obtained by the City
through the surcharge. 23 Justice Broussard further argued that most
of the capitalization did not come from the City, but was obtained
from "ratepayers both within and without the city or obtained by donations to the water system." 24 He concluded that the surcharge imposed was improper since, under the utility basis for determining a
water company's revenue requirements, any sums in excess of gross
working cash requirements should not be considered in rate base calculations; otherwise the City reaps a double return.25 According to
the dissent, "only the investment made by the utility... may be in26
cluded in the rate base."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Justice Broussard gave sparse weight to the fact that city residents,
as individuals, paid taxes and bore burdens to support the water system which nonresidents were able to escape. In this manner, the sep22. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
23. Justice Broussard calculated the amount received by the City from the nonresidents as at least $7 million, as compared to costs incurred by the City in the amount of
$629,000. This represented an excess of ten times the amount properly receivable.

Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1195 n.2, 729 P.2d at 201 n.2, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 37 n.2 (Broussard,
J., concurring and dissenting).
24. Id. at 1191, 792 P.2d at 197, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (Broussard, J., concurring and
dissenting).
25. Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n., 7 Cal. 3d 331, 346, 497 P.2d
785, 796, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 324 (1972) (approving consideration of sums in excess of

gross working cash requirement where such sum was characterized as
"extraordinary").
26. Hansen, 42 Cal. 3d at 1195, 729 P.2d at 200, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 36 (Broussard, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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arate opinion missed the mark. Only by creating a distinction
between the City and its residents was Justice Broussard able to logically maintain his stance. The separate opinion disregarded the fundamental fact that a city cannot properly be distinguished from its
residents. The conclusion of the concurring and dissenting opinion is
therefore uncompelling.
MITCHELL F. DISNEY

VIII.

TORT LAW
A. In defamation actions in which the gravamen of the
plaintiff's claim is the alleged injuriousfalsehood of a
statement made by media defendant, the first
amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that the plaintiffplead and prove the statement to be a
falsehood, and be "ofand concerning" the plaintiff in
some way: Blatty v. New York Times Co.

The court in Blatty v. New York Times Co., 42 Cal. 3d 1033, 728
P.2d 1177, 232 Cal. Rptr. 542 (1986), held that a newspaper could not
be held liable for failing to include a book in its list of "best sellers."
The plaintiff, William P. Blatty, author of The Exorcist and Legion,
originally alleged four causes of action in his complaint: negligent interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, negligence, and trade
libel. After allowing limited discovery, the trial court sustained the
defendant's general demurrer that inter alia, the facts alleged in the
complaint were insufficient to support any cause of action. However,
as to the intentional interference with prospective economic advantage claim, the court granted conditional leave to amend, limiting
Blatty to a cause of action for the intentional omission of Legion
from the "Best Seller List" by the New York Times, with actual
knowledge that the book met the criteria for inclusion in the
newspaper.
The amended complaint asserting five causes of action, though
characterized differently, was essentially the same as the original.
The gist of the grievance continued to be that the list of the Times
was falsely represented as an accurate compilation of book sales. By
not including Legion, the novel was falsely represented by the Times
as not qualifying as a "best seller," and the wrongful exclusion of the
book resulted in damage to Blatty. The court, sustaining a second de-
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murrer grounded on the supposition that no statement had been
made "of and concerning" Blatty, ordered the action dismissed without leave to amend, awarding costs to the Times.
The court of appeal, though otherwise affirming, held the facts alleged in the pleadings sufficient to support the actions for intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. This partial reversal served to vacate the award for costs. Both parties petitioned
for review.
Under the standard of review accorded to a demurrer sustained
without leave to amend, the burden of proving the existence of a reasonable possibility of amending defective pleadings rests entirely on
the plaintiff. Blank v. Kirwan, 39 Cal. 3d 311, 703 P.2d 58, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 718 (1985). As a simple matter of procedure, this burden would
appear to prohibit the advance of Blatty's complaint. However, the
court seemed anxious to voice its thoughts regarding protection of
the right of free expression and a free press.
In support of its reversal of the appellate court decision, insofar as
it reversed the trial court, the supreme court cited the seminal defamation cases involving media defendants, drawing from them several
maxims of first amendment protection: the burden to plead and
prove falsehood is on the plaintiff, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974); no cause of action "can claim.., talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations," New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964); the statement upon which the claim is
based must specifically refer to, or be, "of and concerning" the plaintiff in some way. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 80 (1966). The court
relied on the last principle to decide the case at bar.
The court freely discussed the guile used in recent years in defamation actions, whose gravamen is an alleged injurious falsehood made
by the press defendant, cleverly disguised by the creative pleading of
the plaintiff so as to avoid constitutional detection. Any deception,
though, seems unlikely at best, considering (1) the substantive case
law that stands to preserve a free press, and (2) the inescapable reality that any time a media defendant is hailed into court, he will gird
himself in the armor of the first amendment.
Though properly decided, the entire court being in agreement as to
the outcome of the case, Blatty represents another judicial venture
into territory not necessarily explored. The analysis of the court is
meaningless in light of so much dicta.
TRAVIS P. CLARDY
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B. Employee's civil actionfor damagesfor intentional
infliction of emotional distress which caused physical
injuries based on conduct normally occurring within the
course and scope of employment was barred by Workers'
Compensation Act which thus provided exclusive remedy:
Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist.
In Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal. 3d 148, 729 P.2d
743, 233 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1987), the supreme court held that an employee may not maintain a civil action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress which caused physical disability when he could recover under workers' compensation law. The court found that where
the conduct in question arose from ordinary circumstances of employment, the plaintiff was limited to workers' compensation as the
exclusive remedy.
In Cole, the plaintiff was a firefighter who held the rank of captain.
After approximately seventeen years of service, the plaintiff was
elected union representative. As union representative, the plaintiff
was required to negotiate contracts with the assistant chief who deliberately harassed the plaintiff to punish him for his union activities.
During this period, the plaintiff was diagnosed as having high blood
pressure and was placed on medication. Due to the extreme stress
placed upon him, the plaintiff left his position with the union and
went on sick leave soon thereafter. Despite the plaintiff's superior
job performance, the assistant chief falsely reported that the plaintiff
violated rules of conduct, demoted the plaintiff to engineer, and ordered that he return to work, assigned to menial duties. Although
the defendant's Board of Directors reinstated the plaintiff as captain,
he was placed on probation and the assistant chief attempted to have
him forced into retirement. Finally, the plaintiff suffered a severe
stroke which left him paralyzed and totally disabled.
The plaintiff brought a civil action in the Superior Court of Sacramento County. After the defendant's demurrer was sustained, the
plaintiff appealed his case and subsequently the supreme court
granted review.
The court analyzed the plaintiff's claim under sections 3600 and
3601 of the Labor Code [hereinafter sections 3600 and 3601, respectively]. Section 3600 described the conditions under which an employer was liable to an employee injured on the job due to the
employer's negligent or non-negligent conduct under workers' compensation law. These "conditions of compensation" were met where
1087

the injury occurred within the course and scope of the employment
relationship and was proximately caused thereby. See 65 CAL. JUR.
3D Work Injury Compensation §§ 73-76 & 83 (1981 & Supp. 1986);
Demler, Remedy For the Intentional Torts of a Workmen's Compensation Carrier,1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 54 (1973).
Pursuant to section 3601, a claimant has an exclusive remedy in
workers' compensation against the employer where these conditions
of compensation exist, except where the injury is caused by physical
violence or intoxication by an employee. See 65 CAL. JUR. 3D Work
Injury Compensation §§ 22-27 (1981 & Supp. 1986). Finding that the
conditions of compensation were met in this instance, the court then
turned to cases which found exceptions to the exclusiveness of the
remedy.
The court cited Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833,
147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978), in which the court found that an employee
could maintain an action against the employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress where there was no physical injury. In
Renteria, the plaintiff requested damages for mental suffering caused
by tortious conduct. The Renteria court held that because no remedy
existed in workers' compensation law for the plaintiff's injuries,
workers' compensation law should not bar recovery through civil
action.
The supreme court approved the cases wherein the lower courts
have determined that workers' compensation was the exclusive remedy where intentional infliction of emotional distress resulted in substantial physical injury. See Hollywood Refrigeration Sales Co. v.
Superior Court, 164 Cal. App. 3d 754, 758-60, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 619,
621-22 (1985); Gates v. Trans Video Corp., 93 Cal. App. 3d 196, 204-06,
155 Cal. Rptr. at 486, 491-92 (1979). Since the plaintiff in the instant
case could seek a workers' compensation remedy and had suffered
great physical damage, it was concluded that he had an exclusive
remedy in workers' compensation.
The court then examined Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980),
which held that where the employer's fraudulent conduct aggravated
a work related injury, the employee could maintain a civil action
against his employer for the aggravation. See The Scope of the Exclusive Remedy Under California Labor Code, §§ 3601, 4553; JohnsManville v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 8 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 591
(1981). The court in the present case noted that the conduct which
caused the injury in Johns-Manville did not occur as an incident of
the employment relationship because the employer's concealment of
an industrial injury was not a risk of employment. In contrast, employee disciplinary processes were characterized as ordinary and fore-
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seeable activities necessarily tied to the employment relationship.
Therefore, even though the assistant chief's conduct was performed
with the intent to inflict the plaintiff's injuries, his use of ordinary
processes of employment placed the plaintiff's injuries within the
purview of sections 3600 and 3601.
In conclusion, where conditions of compensation exist, sections
3600 and 3601 create an exclusive remedy for a claimant unless an exception is found. The plaintiff in Cole met these conditions. However, he was not entitled to an exception because he suffered
substantial physical damage which arose from conduct normally occurring within the course and scope of employment. Thus, the plaintiff was restricted to workers' compensation as an exclusive remedy.
SARAH

C.

A.

FUHRMAN

Police misconduct is not a superseding cause of injury
where the injury is a foreseeable consequence of involving
the police; an erroneousjury instruction does not result
in prejudice where no likelihood that the jury believed the
defendant, yet ruled in favor of the plaintiff exists: Pool
v. City of Oakland.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Pool v. City of Oakland,' the court found that a merchant must
exercise due care when calling the police to arrest a suspected counterfeiter. A police officer's false arrest, due to his failure to detect
the legitimacy of a suspicious bill, was held not to have been a superseding cause of the emotional distress experienced by an innocent
customer. The court based these findings on the principle of reasonable foreseeability. In addition, the court decided that no prejudicial
error resulted from the trial court's erroneous jury instruction on
probable cause. The court believed that, since the closing arguments
were fact-specific and since the testimony of the only neutral witness
favored the plaintiff, there was no likelihood that the jury accepted
the defendant's version of the facts, yet decided in favor of the
plaintiff.
1. 42 Cal. 3d 1051, 728 P.2d 1163, 232 Cal. Rptr. 528 (1986). Chief Justice Bird
wrote the majority opinion with Justices Mosk, Broussard, Reynoso, and Panelli concurring. Justice Grodin wrote a separate concurring opinion with Justice Lucas
joining.

1089

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Pool attempted to pay for seven dollars worth of groceries with a
one hundred dollar bill at a Safeway supermarket. 2 The bill did not
bear the phrase "In God We Trust." 3 The checker, pursuant to an
anti-counterfeit plan implemented by Safeway, told Pool to wait
while she obtained his change.4 The checker took the bill to the assistant manager to inspect. The checker testified that the assistant
manager compared the bill's serial numbers to those on a list of coun5
terfeit numbers. However, the assistant manager denied doing so.
The police were called and Pool was arrested.
The testimony yielded two different versions of the arrest. Pool
maintained that he was cooperative with the police even though he
was not advised of his rights, nor told of the charges against him.6
Further, Pool testified that he was handcuffed and shoved against a
cigarette machine. 7 The police officers stated that Pool was handcuffed because he was flailing his arms, either in an attempt to recover the bill or to strike a police officer.8 The officers also testified
that Pool attempted to hang onto the cigarette machine to interfere
with his arrest. However, this incident did not appear in the police
report. 9 The police report did state that Pool refused to let go of a
shopping cart. 10 The checker testified that Pool was cooperative with
the officers."1
Pool was taken to the police station where he was photographed,
fingerprinted, and strip-searched.12 In the meantime, the police department had determined that the bill in question was not counterfeit. Rather, the bill was a series 1950A upon which the phrase "In
God We Trust" was never printed.13 Pool was held and charged with
interfering with a police investigation. 14 He declined his opportunity
to make a phone call and was released the next day.15
Pool sued Safeway and the City of Oakland for intentional infliction of emotional distress, false arrest, and false imprisonment. He
also brought an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress
2. Id. at 1056, 728 P.2d at 1164, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 530.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1056, 728 P.2d at 1164, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
at 1056, 728 P.2d at 1164, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
at 1057, 728 P.2d at 1165, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 530.

at 1058 n.2, 728 P.2d at 1165 n.2, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 531 n.2.

at 1058, 728 P.2d at 1165, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 530. Pool was also subjected to a

visual rectal examination. Id.
13. Id. at 1056, 1058, 728 P.2d at 1164, 1165, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 529, 530.
14. Id. at 1058, 728 P.2d at 1165, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.

15. Id. at 1058, 728 P.2d at 1166, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
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against Safeway. Against the City of Oakland, he added allegations
of assault, battery, and violation of civil rights. Pursuant to a motion
by Safeway, the trial court dropped all but the negligent infliction of
emotional distress act against Safeway. 16 The trial judge held that all
but the civil rights violation claim could be maintained against Oakland17 The jury found in favor of Pool as against both Safeway and
the City of Oakland and awarded $45,000 in damages.1 8 Both defendants appealed.
III.
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Jury Verdict Was Supported By The Evidence.

Safeway contended that the jury verdict was not based upon substantial evidence. Safeway alleged that the jury could not have reasonably found that Safeway was negligent, and that the jury should
have found that the police officers' conduct was an unforeseeable superseding cause. 19 The court observed that the evidence must be
viewed in a light most favorable to Pool, the plaintiff.20 On the question of negligence, the court reviewed Safeway's anti-counterfeit
plan. The evidence revealed that Safeway had informed its employees to watch for one hundred dollar bills that did not bear the phrase
"In God We Trust." 21 The court found that Safeway, in giving such
an instruction to its employees, could reasonably foresee that it
would cause an incident involving an innocent customer. 22 The court
pointed out that Safeway could have easily safeguarded its anti-counterfeit program. 23 Thus, the jury's finding that Safeway was negligent was supported by the evidence.
The court then discussed Safeway's contention that the police officers' conduct was an unforeseeable superseding cause of Pool's injury. Safeway averred that the police officers' failure to detect the
validity of the bill that resulted in the false arrest of Pool was un16. Id.
17. Id. at 1059, 728 P.2d at 1166, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 531.

18. Id.
19. Id. at 1063, 728 P.2d at 1169, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
20. Id. at 1061, 728 P.2d at 1168, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
21. Id. at 1062, 728 P.2d at 1168, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court suggested that Safeway could have properly instructed the employees that not all bills were printed with the phrase "In God We Trust" on them,
compiled a list of the suspect serial numbers and distributed it to all, or informed its
employees to call the twenty-four hour Treasury Department Service with any questions. Id.
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foreseeable. 24 The court rejected this claim by observing that it was
foreseeable that accusing a person of illegal activity would lead to "a
police investigation, escalation of the conflict, and arrest, all of which
would cause emotional distress."25 The court concluded that the conduct of the police officers was irrelevant and the resulting emotional
distress was foreseeable.26
B.

The Damage Award Was Proper.

Safeway alleged that, because Pool failed to utilize his opportunity
to make his allotted phone call at the police station, Pool was contributorily negligent. At the trial, Safeway had proposed an instruction
on contributory negligence which was refused.27 The court found
that the refusal to give the instruction was proper because "'contributory negligence is negligence of the plaintiff before any damage, or
any invasion of his rights, has occurred. . . .' "28 Since the damages
Pool suffered occurred before he declined his opportunity to phone,
Pool did not contribute to his own damages.29 The court suggested,
however, that an instruction on mitigation might have been proper
had Safeway presented evidence showing that if Pool had made a
phone call, he would have been released from jail.30
Both Safeway and the City of Oakland challenged the size of the
damage award. The defendants contended that passion and prejudice
on the part of the jury must have come into play to have arrived at
such a large award.31 The court reiterated that considerable deference must be given to the findings of both the jury and the trial
court.3 2 The court pointed out that Pool, who was fifty-six years of

age at the time, had no prior arrests on his record.3 3 The court also
reflected that Pool suffered greatly, both in front of the other
Safeway customers and at the police station.3 4 At the trial, Pool had
stated that due to the incident, "his blood pressure was higher and
his heartbeat was irregular. . . ."35 Thus, the court pronounced that
24. Id. at 1063, 728 P.2d at 1169, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
25. Id. at 1064, 728 P.2d at 1170, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
26. Id. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 642-43
(8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).

27. Pool, 42 Cal. 3d at 1066, 728 P.2d at 1172, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
28. Id. (quoting W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, at
458 (5th ed. 1984)).
29. Id. at 1066, 728 P.2d at 1171, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
30. Id. at 1067, 728 P.2d at 1172, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
31. Id.

32. Id.
33. Id. at 1068, 728 P.2d at 1172, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
34. Id. at 1068, 728 P.2d at 1172-73, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
35. Id. at 1068, 728 P.2d at 1173, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 538. See generally Annotation,
Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Compensatory Damages for False Imprisonment or

Arrest, 48 A.L.R. 4TH 165 (1986).
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the damage award was not excessive.
C. The Erroneous Instruction on Probable Cause Was Not
Prejudicial.
The court concurred with the City of Oakland's contention that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury on probable cause to
arrest.3 6 The court acknowledged that probable cause to arrest was a
question of law to be determined by the trial court judge. 37 Oakland
claimed that such an error was sufficient to overturn the jury's verdict. However, the court disagreed. The court applied the test compiled from case law in Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co.38 to show that the trial court's error was not prejudicial. This five-factor test was presented as follows:
(1) the degree of conflict in the evidence on critical issues; (2) whether respondent's argument to the jury may have contributed to the instruction's
misleading effect; (3) whether the jury requested a rereading of the erroneous
instruction or of related evidence; (4) the closeness of the jury's verdict; and
(5) the effect of other instructions in remedying the error.3 9

In applying the first factor-the degree of conflict in the evidence-the court reviewed the testimony. The court held that since
Pool's testimony was corroborated by the only neutral witness' (the
Safeway checker) testimony, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the presence of conflicting evidence was minimal.40 The
court moved on to the second factor-counsels' arguments to the
jury. It pointed out that the closing arguments were fact-specific and,
as such, the jury clearly had to decide which version of the facts was
more credible. 41 Therefore, the court found that it was unlikely that
the jury had accepted Oakland's version of the facts, yet decided in
2
favor of the plaintiff.4
The court concluded that no prejudicial impact could be gleaned
from examining factors three and four, since the jury did not request
a re-reading of the instruction and the jury's eleven to one verdict
36. Pool, 42 Cal. 3d at 1069, 728 P.2d at 1173, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
37. Id. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 219-20
(8th ed. 1974).
38. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
39. Pool, 42 Cal. 3d at 1069-70, 728 P.2d at 1174, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 539 (citing Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 771, 686 P.2d 1158,
1168, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 364 (1984)) (citations omitted by the court).
40. Id. at 1071, 728 P.2d at 1174-75, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
41. Id. at 1071-72, 728 P.2d at 1175, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
42. Id. at 1072, 728 P.2d at 1175, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
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was plainly in favor of Pool. 43 The application of the fifth factorthe effect of the other instructions-might have resulted in prejudice,
as there were no other instructions regarding causation on the false
arrest issue. 44 However, the court added a sixth factor to the Seaman's test. The court held that the existence of multiple causes of
action must be considered in deciding whether prejudice resulted
from the giving of an erroneous instruction. 45 In the instant case,
Oakland failed to request a special verdict. Therefore, the jury could
have rested liability on the assault and battery, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, or false imprisonment causes of action, and not
on the false arrest allegation46 Thus, the court believed that the potential for prejudice due to the erroneous instruction was minimal,
7
and affirmed the judgment.4

IV.

JUSTICE GRODIN'S CONCURRING OPINION

Justice Grodin separately concurred to emphasize that normally a
person does not incur civil liability by reporting potentially illegal
conduct to the police even where that person was negligent in having
done so. 48 The Justice cited several cases holding that a good faith
report to the police was "conditionally privileged." 49 Justice Grodin
pointed out that the majority did not address this issue since Safeway
0
never offered it as a defense.5
V.

CONCLUSION

In concluding that the police officers' failure to detect the validity
of the one hundred dollar bill was not a superseding cause of Pool's
injury, the court may have inadvertently overruled the existing case
law pointed out by Justice Grodin's concurrence. However, this case
may be limited to its facts since the defense failed to rely on existing
precedent. The court's application of the Seaman's test to determine
whether an erroneous instruction resulted in prejudicial error provides a clear standard for subsequent courts, although the final issue
appears to be whether the resulting verdict would have been ren43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1072, 728 P.2d at 1175, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1072-73, 728 P.2d at 1175-76, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
48. Id. at 1074, 728 P.2d at 1176, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Grodin, J., concurring).
49. Id. (Grodin, J., concurring) (citing Peterson v. Robinson, 43 Cal. 2d 690, 695,
277 P.2d 19, 23 (1954); Turner v. Mellon, 41 Cal. 2d 45, 48-49, 257 P.2d 15, 19 (1953);
Miller v. Fano, 134 Cal. 103, 106-07, 66 P. 183, 184 (1901)). See generally Annotation,
False Imprisonment: Liability of Private Citizen, Calling on Police for Assistance Af-

ter Disturbanceor Trespass,for False Arrest by Officer, 98 A.L.R. 3D 542 (1980).
50. Pool, 42 Cal. 3d at 1074, 728 P.2d at 1177, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 542 (Grodin, J.,
concurring).
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dered differently but for the instruction. The addition of the sixth
factor to the test should enable wise defendants confronted with multiple causes of action to request a special verdict if an instruction is
objectionable.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT

D.

No right of actionfor lost economic advantage is
recognized for interference by one equestrian harness
race driver with the horse of another during a race for
prize money: Youst v. Longo.

In Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 729 P.2d 728, 233 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1987), the court decided whether an equestrian harness racer may be
held liable under the tort doctrine of interference with prospective
economic advantage when he negligently or intentionally interferes
with a competitor's horse during a race for prize money. The court
answered the question in the negative based on two primary points:
(1) the speculative nature of such a cause of action in the realm of
sporting events; and (2) the existence of countervailing policy considerations. Additionally, the court found that the California Horse
Racing Board, as a purely regulatory and disciplinary body, lacks jurisdiction over controversies which sound in tort.
Justice Lucas,
writing for the court, noted initially that a cause of action for the tort
of interference with prospective economic advantage required a
"threshold causation requirement" necessitating a finding "that it is
reasonably probable that the lost economic advantage would have
been realized but for the defendant's interference." Id. at 71, 729
P.2d at 733, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 298 (emphasis in original). See also
Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 865, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745
(1975).
The court then distinguished two decisions relied upon by the
plaintiff which granted relief despite highly speculative circumstances, since those cases involved strong public policy reasons for relaxing the threshold requirement of proving probable economic gain.
In Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App. 3d 365, 122
Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975), the court allowed a challenge by a political candidate against an opponent for interference with the opportunity to
win a campaign based upon the policy against interference with elections and the policy reasons in favor of the public's right to accurate
information. The court easily distinguished Gold by noting that a
1095

sporting event does not carry the same importance to the public as
does the integrity of the election process.
The plaintiff also cited Smith v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. App. 3d
491, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1984), in support of his action. Smith involved a suit against an opponent in litigation for interference with
the opportunity to win the lawsuit. The threshold causation requirement was relaxed by the Smith court because the case involved the
policy of preservation of the integrity of civil litigation.
Additionally, Justice Lucas suggested that this threshold proof requirement-that economic gain would have been received but for the
defendant's misconduct-was particularly important in cases involving sporting contests. In support of this assertion, the chief justice
first posited a "floodgate" rationale, noting that numerous" lawsuits
based upon alleged expectancies of winning sporting contests would
likely materialize if the threshold proof requirement were discarded.
The court further noted that sporting event cases traditionally involve elements of luck and chance, and the employment of unusual
skills by the participants. As a result, determination of the presence
or extent of economic loss would be practically impossible. By comparison, in most cases in which redress for the tort has been granted,
"'it [was] possible to estimate with some fair amount of success both
the value of what ha[d] been lost and the likelihood that the plaintiff
would have received it if the defendant had not interfered.'" Youst,
43 Cal. 3d at 75, 729 P.2d at 735, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (quoting W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 130 at 1006 (5th ed. 1984) (italics
omitted). The court concluded that the tort action would not lie
where the dispute arose in the realm of sporting events.
In addition to finding the plaintiff's cause of action invalid as a
matter of law, Chief Justice Lucas offered two convincing public policy arguments. He first suggested that the general interest in avoiding excessive and time-consuming courtroom litigation would be
undermined if a cause of action for this tort were recognized in the
area of sporting events. He noted that the California Horse Racing
Board [hereinafter the Board] provided various remedies for aggrieved racers.
The chief justice next stated that nonrecognition of the tort in the
arena of sporting activities was warranted by a strong policy favoring
the maintenance of the special nature of competitive contests. He
suggested that if such a cause of action were allowed, few sporting
events would transpire without a tort claim from a losing competitor.
Additionally, the court recognized the inherent imprecision involved
in sporting events, particularly in the sport of harness racing, where
drivers are known to be aggressive in the maneuvering of their carts
for better track position. Thus, the court concluded that public policy
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reasons forbade recognition of the plaintiff's cause of action.
The
plaintiff had not sought economic redress from the Board prior to filing his complaint in the superior court. Although the Board had authority to preside over the controversy, its own policies precluded it
from awarding affirmative pecuniary relief. The court of appeal,
however, concluded that the Board did have the authority to award
such compensation under the circumstances of this case.
The supreme court disagreed with the court of appeal on the issue
of the Board's authority. Chief Justice Lucas stated that "the power
to award compensatory and punitive tort damages to an injured party
is a judicial function." Id. at 80, 729 P.2d at 739, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
Furthermore, said the court, the legislation which authorized the
Board's creation suggested that its powers were limited to regulation
and discipline. Finally, the court noted that title 4, section 1699(c) of
the Administrative Code provided a specific penalty for acts of interference like those committed by the defendant in this case. That
remedy-the disqualification of the interfering party's horse, and
placement behind the horse of the party interfered with-had already been effectuated in the instant case. The court concluded that
this administrative remedy was the plaintiff's sole means of redress
against the defendant. As a result of the application of the abovementioned statute, the plaintiff recovered $5,000 by virtue of having
been advanced to fifth place from sixth.
MITCHELL

F.

DISNEY
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